Radical Embodied Inferentialism and Objectivity in Language

点击翻译按钮获取中文摘要

My research is concerned with whether a synthesis of inferentialism and radical embodied cognitive science (RECS) can contribute to addressing the higher-level cognition problem. Anthony Chemero articulates RECS as a synthesis of ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory (DST). Ecological psychology explains perception and action together in terms of direct perception of affordances, opportunities for action in the environment. DST models systems with differential equations, characterising their evolution in continuous time, and can describe the coupling of an organism with its environment, forming one nondecomposable system. This approach is in contrast to those for which cognition essentially involves operations over symbolic representations. RECS has successfully modelled simple sensorimotor processes. However, an open problem is how it can explain 'higher-level' cognition, which seemingly requires representations. Existing responses emphasise scaffolding, whereby complex conceptual cognition is undergirded by our access to a richly structured social-cultural environment. In particular, natural language and scientific models are two external cognitive tools which modulate our collective interaction with the world. RECS therefore requires a robust nonrepresentational account of these seemingly representational activities. I aim to provide such an account by developing a synthesis of RECS and inferentialism, which explains the meaning of linguistic signs in terms of the inferences that can correctly be made to and from them, emphasising linguistic normativity, reasoning practises, and what Robert Brandom calls entitlements and commitments to infer or act. Inferentialism has been adapted for scientific models by Mauricio Suárez and others, for whom the purpose of models is their allowing inferences about modelled systems. Despite shared emphasis on practise over representation, no fully articulated RECS-inferentialist synthesis exists. The project core will be articulating the conceptual relations between these approaches. For example, the normative inferential structure of public language, and the entitlements and commitments of agents, might be rendered in terms of affordances. The framework applies to both language and models, for which a unified inferentialist account will be sought. On this basis, the higher-level cognition problem can be explicitly addressed. Existing literature will be drawn on and developed, including: RECS work on scientific models; RECS-adjacent approaches to language, such as distributed language, according to which language is an embodied, interactive process, not a given structure of abstract symbols; work about the existence and nature of linguistic rules and normativity; and explanations of higher-level cognition which emphasises the complex social-cultural landscape of affordances available to humans. There is an implicit tension to be addressed in my conceptual investigations: distributed language prioritises agent-driven dynamics, but for others, social-cultural structure is primary. My project will draw on both sides of this divide to integrate both levels, contributing to understanding the relative role of and relation between them in accounting for linguistic, conceptual activities. Existing work on both inferentialist and embodied conceptions of (individual and collective) agency will be employed to examine how agents interact with and dynamically (re)construct the landscape of linguistic affordances. My public engagement activities will primarily involve exploring the implications of my research for machine learning/AI research and practice. For example, it suggests that artificial agents' understanding of language will lie in embodiment (through, for example, robotics, or simulated structured environments), multi-agent coordination, and linguistic social norms.