Constitutional Politics and Anticipated Leadership Transition in Non-Democracies: Case Studies in Russia, Armenia and Belarus

非民主国家的宪政政治和预期的领导层过渡：俄罗斯、亚美尼亚和白俄罗斯的案例研究

• 批准号: 2575061
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University College London
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2021 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2575061
• 关键词: Constitutional; Politics; Anticipated; Leadership; Transition

Why do non-democratic regimes amend constitutions if constitutions in such regimes constitute mere window dressing and do not really constrain? This project seeks to test the hypothesis that periods of anticipated leadership transition (arising from the impending expiry of constitutional term limits, the occurrence of public unrest, or both these factors) are the primary explanation for constitutional amendments that appear to legally limit but in fact expand autocratic power in non-democratic regimes. Existing research has sought to answer the question above in different ways. The unique feature of this project is that it will concretely define sub-categories of "anticipated transition" and then systematically apply a tripartite test to the main hypothesis by considering the following three stages of amendment: (a) cause; (b) process; and (c) outcome (see Figure 1 below). This test will be applied in three case studies from contemporary politics in non-democratic regimes: Putin's constitutional amendments in the Russian Federation in 2020; the amendments put by Sargsyan to the Armenian public in 2015; and amendments proposed by Lukashenka in Belarus in 2021. Each of these case studies exhibit anticipated leadership change arising from the impending expiry of constitutional term limits (Russia), the occurrence of public unrest (Belarus) or a combination of both (Armenia). The research will help to systematise the response of international and domestic institutions to proposed reform in non-democratic regimes with the policy objective of aiding the constraint of autocracy through constitutional politics and (at the very least) resisting the augmentation of autocratic political power. The project will establish a "red flag" monitoring framework for identifying the potential use of constitutional amendment for ends that augment rather than constrain power. The research will use a blend of expertise in constitutional law and political science.

如果非民主政权的宪法只是装点门面，并不真正具有约束力，那么为什么要修改宪法呢？这个项目试图检验这样一种假设，即预期的领导层换届时期(由于即将到期的宪法任期、公众动乱的发生，或者这两个因素)是修宪的主要解释，修宪似乎在法律上限制了非民主政权的独裁权力，但实际上扩大了独裁权力。现有的研究试图以不同的方式回答上述问题。该项目的独特之处在于，它将具体界定“预期过渡”的子类别，然后通过考虑以下三个修正阶段，系统地对主要假设进行三方检验：(A)原因；(B)过程；(C)结果(见下文图1)。这一测试将应用于非民主政权下当代政治的三个案例研究：2020年俄罗斯联邦普京的宪法修正案；2015年萨尔基相向亚美尼亚公众提出的修正案；以及2021年白俄罗斯卢卡申科提出的修正案。每个案例研究都显示了由于即将到期的宪法任期(俄罗斯)、发生公共动乱(白俄罗斯)或两者兼而有之(亚美尼亚)而预期的领导层更迭。这项研究将有助于系统化国际和国内机构对非民主政权拟议改革的反应，其政策目标是通过宪法政治帮助约束独裁，并(至少)抵制独裁政治权力的扩大。该项目将建立一个“危险信号”监测框架，以确定宪法修正案可能用于扩大而不是限制权力的目的。这项研究将综合运用宪法和政治学方面的专业知识。