The Politics of Deterring Unwanted Immigration in the United Kingdom

我的论文将调查英国通过实施敌对威慑政策来阻止未来寻求庇护和非正常移民的努力。将讨论三个问题。首先，移民威慑政策是否能有效地减少不必要的移民？第二，公众更喜欢哪种移民威慑政策？第三，决策者为什么要实施这样的政策？本论文将弥合以前孤立的学术辩论，并使用新的方法贡献实证研究结果。在英国脱欧后移民制度的持续不确定性和公众对增加船只海峡过境点的强烈反对的时候，本文将试图揭示移民威慑政策的基本原理。介绍性章节将提供一个理论上的贡献，通过统一三个领域往往被视为不同的虐待：移民的态度，民主的反应和政策的有效性。本论文将由四个实证章节组成。前两个实证章节将致力于评估英国移民威慑政策的有效性。正如Thielmann（2003年）所概述的那样，限制性移民政策只有在移民在抵达之前了解这些政策的情况下才能阻止潜在的移民。如果未来的移民既不了解这些政策，也不将其纳入成本效益分析，这些政策就无法有效地劝阻移民。第一章将评估潜在的信息提供者-援助人员、走私网络和散居国外者-是否向移民提供了关于联合王国威慑政策的准确信息。在第二章中，我将确定未来的移民是否被告知联合王国的威慑政策，以及这种知识是否是他们选择目的地国的一个因果驱动因素。第三章将重新审视舆论与政策之间的差距。我将使用一种新颖的方法来测试公众偏好和移民政策之间的差距是否存在以及差距的程度。通过两波联合实验，我还将评估英国脱欧是否增加了公众偏好和移民政策之间的一致性。最后，第四章将致力于对导致2014年和2016年移民法案的决策过程进行定性案例研究，该法案被广泛称为“敌对环境政策”。本章的目的将是评估为什么政策制定者实施移民威慑政策，并调查象征性和种族政治在构建敌对环境政策中的作用。

My dissertation will investigate the United Kingdom's bid to deter future asylum-seeking and irregular immigration by implementing hostile deterrence policies. Three questions will be addressed. First, are immigration deterrence policies effective at curtailing unwanted immigration? Second, which immigration deterrence policies does the public prefer? Third, why do policymakers implement such policies? This dissertation will bridge previously isolated scholarly debates and contribute empirical findings using novel methods. At a time of continued uncertainty over the United Kingdom's post-Brexit immigration regime and popular backlash over the increase of boat Channel crossings, this dissertation will seek to uncover the rationale underlying immigration deterrence policies. The introductory chapter will offer a theoretical contribution by uniting three areas often mistreated as disparate: immigration attitudes, democratic responsiveness and policy effectiveness. The dissertation will then consist of four empirical chapters. The first two empirical chapters will be dedicated to assessing the effectiveness of British immigration deterrence policies. As outlined by Thielmann (2003), restrictionist immigration policies can only deter potential migrants if migrants are aware of these policies prior to arrival. If prospective migrants are neither informed of these policies nor incorporate them in a cost-benefit analysis, they are ineffective in their aim to dissuade immigration. The first chapter will assess whether accurate information on the United Kingdom's deterrence policies is made available to migrants by potential information-providers: aid workers, smuggling networks and diaspora members. In the second chapter, I will determine whether prospective migrants are informed of the United Kingdom's deterrence policies and whether that knowledge is a causal driver in their choice of destination country. The third chapter will revisit the opinion-policy gap. I will test the existence and extent of a gap between public preferences and immigration policies using a novel method. Through a two-wave conjoint experiment, I will also assess whether Brexit has increased the congruence between public preferences and immigration policies. Finally, the fourth chapter will be dedicated to a qualitative case study of the policymaking process leading up to the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts widely known as the 'hostile environment policy'. The aim of this chapter will be to assess why policymakers implement immigration deterrence policies and investigate the role of symbolic and racial politics in the construction of the hostile environment policy.