Meaning in Science, Evaluative Scientific Concepts, and the Fact-Value Separability of Mixed Social Science

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I am proposing to examine, in detail, Hilary Putnam's claim that the 'irreducibly evaluative' content of our evaluative concepts makes empiricalsocial scientific inquiries into those concepts 'fact-value inseparable.' In so doing I will develop a taxonomization of the different senses in whichscience can be 'fact-value inseparable.'To facilitate the clear development of this taxonomization I will develop an explicit theory of meaning, specifically for science, using normativeinferentialist semantics. I will also draw on the philosophical literature on the quantification of knowledge to develop formal models illustratinghow questions, and answers to them, can have 'degrees of irreducibly evaluative informational content.' These models will help to make precisewhat might otherwise seem to be vague and therefore unserious claims about fact-value separabillity.I will apply these ideas to a series of detailed case studies on the measurement of evaluative concepts from different ends of a spectrum ofevaluative informational content. In so doing, I will expect to partially vindicate, and crucially clarify, Putnam's argument.This analysis has the potential to (1) facilitate methodological reflection and adjustment which can help make empirical inquiries into evaluativeconcepts more transparent and useful, and (2) show how we can respond to claims which exaggerate the 'fact-value inseparability' of socialscience, in a way that potentially promotes undue scepticism about social science.