The rationality of emotions about imagined scenarios

关于想象场景的情感的合理性

• 批准号: 2712229
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University College London
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2022 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2712229
• 关键词: rationality; emotions; about; imagined; scenarios

The 'Myth of the passions', as Solomon (1977) named it, highlights a belief unquestioned for centuries: that emotions are strictly separate from reason. However, recent work (both empirical and philosophical) has challenged this assumption and uncovered noteworthy links between rationality and emotions. In light of these connections, emotions can now be assessed in relation to different rationality criteria. For instance, epistemic criteria track the extent to which our emotions accurately represent and respond to the world: if a bear is running towards you, fear is an appropriate response to the danger. Indeed, on some views your fear essentially represents the bear as dangerous (Deonna & Teroni, 2012, call these views 'evaluationist', according to which emotions represent their objects as bearing a certain property). Additionally, emotions can also be subjected to practical rationality criteria, which measure the extent to which emotions help satisfy the goals of the agent (fear of the bear makes one run away, thus satisfying one's goal of safety).The question thus arises: When is an emotion justified? As already hinted, one could compile a list of norms for emotions, such as epistemological, practical, coherence-based and so on (Majeed, 2020; Scarantino and de Sousa, 2021). While applying these norms may suffice for analysing regular emotional occurrences, not all emotions lend themselves to such analyses or are as straightforwardly related to our goals. As such, in my research I will focus on more 'problematic' types of emotional episodes: i) emotions about imagined scenarios and, relatedly, ii) emotions about fiction. Neither of these straightforwardly satisfies the norms mentioned above. Does this mean we are irrational for experiencing them? No, or so I shall argue.Consider the following scenario: unprompted, one begins to consider the possibility of their partner cheating on them, and they therefore feel sadness, followed by anger. Assume that their partner has not given them any reason for suspicion, nor is the relationship in a strained phase. By the time they meet, the emotions have ceased and the couple's behaviour towards one another remains unaffected. How might we judge those emotions?My novel approach is to explore the possibility that these emotions evaluate and re-affirm our deeper selves. By deeper self I understand, roughly, the totality of values and preferences we harbour. If that is the case, emotions about mere possibilities do not require useful outcomes to be deemed rational. Instead, we need to focus on what they seek to express in relation to our deeper selves. In our example, the subject's sadness and anger are justified because they express and re-affirm love for the partner. As such, our tendencies to frequently consider alternative possibilities (even highly unlikely or absurd possibilities like transforming into a rat) are not as irrational as they may seem. Indeed, they help maintain awareness of our valuation systems and re-confirm beliefs we may doubt, such as whether we still love our partner. Of course, allowing oneself to be swayed by such emotions may lead to undesirable outcomes, but that is external to their rationality qua expression.Thus, this project will provide a basis for understanding the rationality of emotions about possibilities that is i) not based on their external consequences, and ii) more explanatory than mere fittingness to their object. In other words, this project will provide an explanation for an all-too-common psychological phenomenon.

所罗门（1977）将其命名为“激情的神话”，它强调了一个几个世纪以来都没有受到质疑的信念：情感与理性是严格分开的。然而，最近的工作（经验和哲学）已经挑战了这一假设，并发现了理性和情感之间值得注意的联系。根据这些联系，现在可以根据不同的理性标准来评估情绪。例如，认知标准追踪我们的情绪在多大程度上准确地代表和回应世界：如果一只熊正向你跑来，恐惧是对危险的适当反应。事实上，在某些观点中，你的恐惧本质上代表了熊的危险性（Deonna & Teroni，2012，称这些观点为“评价主义者”，根据这种观点，情绪代表他们的对象具有某种属性）。此外，情绪也可以服从于实际合理性标准，该标准衡量情绪在多大程度上有助于满足代理人的目标（对熊的恐惧使人逃跑，从而满足了一个人的安全目标）。问题由此产生：什么时候情绪是合理的？正如已经暗示的那样，人们可以编制一份情感规范列表，例如认识论的，实践的，基于连贯性的等等（Majeed，2020; Scarantino和de Sousa，2021）。虽然应用这些规范可能足以分析经常发生的情绪，但并非所有的情绪都适合这样的分析，或者与我们的目标直接相关。因此，在我的研究中，我将专注于更多“问题”类型的情感事件：i）关于想象场景的情感，以及相关的，ii）关于小说的情感。这两种方法都不能直接满足上面提到的规范。这是否意味着我们在经历它们时是非理性的？不，或者我会这么说。考虑以下场景：一个人在没有提示的情况下开始考虑伴侣欺骗他们的可能性，因此他们感到悲伤，然后是愤怒。假设他们的伴侣没有给他们任何怀疑的理由，关系也没有处于紧张阶段。当他们见面时，感情已经停止，夫妻双方对彼此的行为仍然不受影响。我们如何判断这些情绪？我的新方法是探索这些情绪评估和重新肯定我们更深层次自我的可能性。通过更深层次的自我，我大致理解了我们所拥有的价值观和偏好的总体。如果是这样的话，仅仅是关于可能性的情绪并不需要有用的结果被认为是理性的。相反，我们需要关注他们试图表达的与我们更深层次的自我有关的东西。在我们的例子中，受试者的悲伤和愤怒是合理的，因为它们表达并重申了对伴侣的爱。因此，我们经常考虑其他可能性的倾向（即使是极不可能或荒谬的可能性，比如变成一只老鼠）并不像它们看起来那么不合理。事实上，它们有助于保持对我们的评估系统的认识，并重新确认我们可能怀疑的信念，例如我们是否仍然爱我们的伴侣。当然，允许自己被这些情绪所左右可能会导致不希望的结果，但这是外在于它们作为表达的理性。因此，这个项目将提供一个基础来理解情绪关于可能性的合理性，这是i）不基于它们的外部后果，ii）比仅仅适合于它们的对象更有解释力。换句话说，这个项目将为一个非常普遍的心理现象提供解释。