The Potential of Zero-Knowledge-Proof to the Attribution Dilemma

零知识证明解决归因困境的潜力

• 批准号: 2726712
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University College London
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2022 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2726712
• 关键词: Potential; Zero; Knowledge; Proof; Attribution

Cyber incidents are on the rise and represent a threat to states' sovereignty. The attribution of those cyber incidents is essential to state's response to cyberthreats. As a result, scholars have focused on the process of attribution and evidentiary standards for proving the provenance of cyberattacks. Nevertheless, with only a legal system establishing evidentiary standards for attributing cyberattacks, states will still be limited to sharing evidence for not comprising cyber operations and revealing sensitive data. For this reason, the research proposal suggests that rather than setting evidentiary standards, the method of zero-knowledge proofs could solve the problem in question. It could allow states to prove cyberattacks' provenance and attribute them to other states without revealing sensitive information. Being the first study to address such a question with zero-knowledge proofs, it should, therefore, be of value to policymakers, researchers, and students in the field of international security.

网络事件正在增加，对国家主权构成威胁。这些网络事件的归属对于国家应对网络威胁至关重要。因此，学者们把重点放在了归因过程和证明网络攻击来源的证据标准上。尽管如此，由于只有一个法律的体系建立了网络攻击的证据标准，各国仍将限于分享不包括网络行动和披露敏感数据的证据。出于这个原因，研究建议，而不是设置证据标准，零知识证明的方法可以解决问题。它可以允许各国证明网络攻击的来源，并将其归咎于其他国家，而不会泄露敏感信息。作为第一个用零知识证明解决这一问题的研究，它应该对国际安全领域的政策制定者、研究人员和学生有价值。