The Potential of Zero-Knowledge-Proof to the Attribution Dilemma

网络事件呈上升趋势，对国家主权构成威胁。这些网络事件的归属对于国家应对网络威胁至关重要。因此，学者们把重点放在了证明网络攻击来源的归因过程和证据标准上。然而，由于只有一个法律体系确立了归责网络攻击的证据标准，各国仍将仅限于分享不构成网络行动和泄露敏感数据的证据。因此，研究提案建议，零知识证明的方法可以解决问题，而不是设定证据标准。它可以让各国证明网络攻击的来源，并在不泄露敏感信息的情况下将其归咎于其他国家。作为第一个用零知识证明来解决这一问题的研究，它应该对国际安全领域的政策制定者、研究人员和学生有价值。

Cyber incidents are on the rise and represent a threat to states' sovereignty. The attribution of those cyber incidents is essential to state's response to cyberthreats. As a result, scholars have focused on the process of attribution and evidentiary standards for proving the provenance of cyberattacks. Nevertheless, with only a legal system establishing evidentiary standards for attributing cyberattacks, states will still be limited to sharing evidence for not comprising cyber operations and revealing sensitive data. For this reason, the research proposal suggests that rather than setting evidentiary standards, the method of zero-knowledge proofs could solve the problem in question. It could allow states to prove cyberattacks' provenance and attribute them to other states without revealing sensitive information. Being the first study to address such a question with zero-knowledge proofs, it should, therefore, be of value to policymakers, researchers, and students in the field of international security.