Rebel-civilian relations and their effects on rebel-state bargaining dynamics

该项目探讨了一个新的贡献，对冲突复发和叛乱国家讨价还价的文献，通过研究叛乱治理机构和叛乱分子领导的政治动员的变量，可以减轻冲突复发的风险。以前的研究产生了矛盾的结果时，看叛军治理叛军国家谈判和冲突解决的影响。我认为，造成这一差异的一个潜在原因是，这些研究没有关注平民参与反叛分子治理机构或反叛分子领导的运动或政党的程度。基于我的论点从民主和平理论和观众成本理论的概念，我认为，叛军采用参与形式的叛军-平民关系提供更可靠的信息，民众的支持和解决，因此可以更容易地建立与国家的谈判，与较低的冲突发生后的复发率。

This project explores a novel contribution to the literature on conflict recurrence and rebel-state bargaining, by looking into rebel governance institutions and rebel-led political mobilization as variables that could mitigate the risk of conflict recurrence. Previous research has produced contradictory results when looking at the effects of rebel governance on rebel-state negotiations and conflict resolution. I posit that a potential reason for this discrepancy is the fact that these studies did not pay attention to the level of civilian participation within rebel governance institutions or within a rebel-led movement or political party. Basing my argument on concepts from the democratic peace theory and the audience costs theory, I argue that rebels employing participatory forms of rebel-civilian relations provide more reliable information on popular support and resolve, therefore can more easily establish negotiations with the state, with a lower rate of conflict recurrence after the negotiations happen.