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The Semantic Paradoxes: critical edition and translation of Bradwardine's 'Insolubilia'

语义悖论：布拉德沃丁《不溶》的批评版和翻译

基本信息

批准号：
AH/E503594/1
负责人：
Stephen Read
金额：
$ 3.56万
依托单位：
University of St Andrews
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2006
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2006 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FE503594%2F1
关键词：
Semantic Paradoxes critical edition translation

项目摘要

One of the most challenging problems in philosophical logic is to give an account of truth and meaning which is not undermined by the logical paradoxes, in particular, the semantic paradoxes such as the Liar paradox. This paradox arises from considering such a sentence as 'This sentence is false', which seems to be true just when it is false and vice versa. Much attention has been given to these paradoxes throughout the past hundred years, without satisfactory agreement on a solution which does not make the cure worse than the disease. For example, Tarski's solution in the 1930s seemed to involve abandoning any attempt to define truth for natural languages, and Kripke's proposal in 1975 required not only the abandonment of Bivalence (concluding that the Liar sentence is neither true nor false) but also recognition that this fact could not be consistently stated. Both Tarski and Kripke resort to a hierarchy of object language (for which truth is defined) and metalanguage {defining truth for the object language), albeit in Kripke's case this is needed only for claims such as that the Liar sentence is paradoxical and neither true nor false.Much attention was also paid to the semantic paradoxes in the Middle Ages, especially in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The theory presented by John Buridan around 1350 has been extensively discussed in the past sixty years, and was given its best treatment by George Hughes in an edition, translation and commentary published in 1982. But not only are there several problems with Buridan's proposal, but the central idea was anticipated in the discussion of the paradoxes by Thomas Bradwardine, writing in Oxford in the 1320s. This work was first edited in 1970, but exists only in Latin, and the test is based on just one manuscript, though the editor even then knew of three others. We now know of at least thirteen mss. In earlier publications, 1 have argued that Bradwardine's solution is not vulnerable to the objections which undermine Buridan's, and indeed, have presented Bradwardine's solution as worthy of contemporary examination and elaboration. I have also identified several passages where the existing text can be removed by consulting other mss.My aim is to establish a critical edition of the Latin text from all thirteen mss., and to provide an English translation of the work, in order to bring it to a wider audience of both researchers and students. My model would be Hughes's treatment of Buridan's similar text. Like Buridan's, Bradwardine's treatise is a beautifully written work, closely argued and powerfully presented. In the first few chapters, Bradwardine considers the prevailing doctrines in his own day, notably those of the ''nullifiers', who claim that such sentences say nothing, and the "restrictors", who say that no expression can refer tothe whole of which it is part. He dismisses these views incisively, views which have obvious parallels in contemporary philosophy. He then sets out the various assumptions on which his own solution depends, and shows clearly how the paradox is solved, before extending the solution to other paradoxical or "insoluble" cases such as the famous Plato/Aristotle paradox, where Plato says that what Aristotle says is true while Aristotle says that what Plato says is false.

哲学逻辑中最具挑战性的问题之一是给出一个不被逻辑悖论，特别是语义悖论（如骗子悖论）所破坏的真理和意义的解释。这个悖论产生于考虑这样一个句子，“这个句子是假的”，当它是假的时候，它似乎是真的，反之亦然。在过去的一百年里，人们对这些矛盾给予了很大的关注，但没有找到一种令人满意的解决办法，使治疗不会比疾病更糟。例如，塔斯基在20世纪30年代提出的解决方案似乎涉及放弃任何为自然语言定义真理的尝试，而克里普克在1975年提出的建议不仅要求放弃二元性（结论是说谎者的句子既不是真的也不是假的），而且还要求承认这一事实不能被一致地陈述。塔斯基和克里普克都采用了对象语言（为其定义真理）和元语言（为对象语言定义真理）的层次结构，尽管在克里普克的案例中，只有在诸如“说谎者”这句话是自相矛盾的、既非真也非假的断言中才需要这种层次结构。在中世纪，特别是在13世纪和14世纪，语义悖论也得到了很多关注。约翰·布里丹（John Buridan）在1350年左右提出的这一理论在过去的60年里得到了广泛的讨论，并在1982年出版的乔治·休斯（George Hughes）的版本、翻译和评论中得到了最好的处理。但布里丹的提议不仅存在一些问题，而且其核心思想早在托马斯·布拉德瓦尔丁（Thomas Bradwardine）于1320年代在牛津撰写的关于悖论的讨论中就已经预料到了。这部作品于1970年首次编辑，但只有拉丁文版本，而且测试只基于一份手稿，尽管当时的编辑还知道还有三份手稿。我们现在知道至少有13位小姐。在早期的出版物中，我认为Bradwardine的解决方案不容易受到削弱Buridan的反对意见的影响，事实上，Bradwardine的解决方案值得当代的研究和阐述。我还确定了几个段落，其中现有的文本可以通过咨询其他小姐删除。我的目标是从所有13种文本中建立一个拉丁文本的评论版本。，并提供该作品的英文翻译，以便将其带给更广泛的研究人员和学生。我的模式是休斯对布里丹类似文本的处理。和布里丹的论文一样，布拉德瓦尔丁的论文写得很漂亮，论证严密，表达有力。在前几章中，Bradwardine考虑了当时流行的学说，特别是那些“否定者”，他们声称这样的句子什么也没有说，以及“限制者”，他们说任何表达都不能指它是一部分的整体。他尖锐地驳斥了这些观点，这些观点在当代哲学中有明显的相似之处。然后，他列出了自己的解决方案所依赖的各种假设，并清楚地展示了如何解决悖论，然后将解决方案扩展到其他悖论或“不可解”的情况，例如著名的柏拉图/亚里士多德悖论，柏拉图说亚里士多德所说的是真的，而亚里士多德说柏拉图所说的是假的。