权益分类	功能权益	普通用户	{{item.name}}会员
{{category.name}}	{{benefitItem.name}}

Issues in modal epistemology

模态认识论问题

基本信息

批准号：
AH/F002394/1
负责人：
Dominic Gregory
金额：
$ 2.86万
依托单位：
University of Sheffield
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2008
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2008 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FF002394%2F1
关键词：
Issues modal epistemology

项目摘要

We have very many modal beliefs - beliefs about what might and must be - and those beliefs are philosophically perplexing. So how can we form justified beliefs about what might have been the case but isn't so when our senses only ever tell us about how things are? I know that there are crows and I know that there are stripy things, for example, having seen items of both kinds. But what justifies my belief that there could be stripy crows even though none really exist? Why shouldn't stripyness and crowhood be as incompatible as squareness and roundness? The puzzles deepen when one considers how we in fact arrive at modal beliefs. Many of those beliefs derive from our imaginative abilities: if I were asked why I believe that there could be stripy crows, I would cite my power to imagine them. But why think that our imaginations provide us with reliable information about how things might be? It's not as though our imaginings involve encounters with merely possible things just as our sensings generally involve encounters with real ones. Despite the pressing nature of the philosophical issues raised by our modal beliefs, the philosophical study of modal knowledge - modal epistemology - is relatively undeveloped. It is therefore a very fertile area for new research on fundamental questions. My own work will investigate issues arising from the roles which our imaginations play in generating beliefs about what's possible. For instance, one strand of my research will examine the view that our imaginations, like our sensory powers, generate appearances of distinctive types, while another will investigate the philosophical consequences of our apparent ability to imagine situations featuring fictional characters.

我们有很多模态信念--关于什么可能和必须是什么的信念--这些信念在理论上是令人困惑的。那么，当我们的感官只告诉我们事情是如何发生的时候，我们如何才能形成合理的信念呢？我知道有乌鸦，我知道有条纹的东西，例如，看到这两种项目。但是，什么证明我的信念，可能有条纹乌鸦，即使没有真正存在？为什么条纹和乌鸦不应该像方形和圆形一样不相容呢？当我们考虑到我们实际上是如何得出模态信念的时候，这个难题就更加复杂了。这些信念中有许多来自于我们的想象力：如果有人问我为什么我相信可能有条纹乌鸦，我会引用我想象它们的能力。但为什么认为我们的想象力为我们提供了有关事物可能如何的可靠信息呢？这并不像我们的感知通常涉及与真实的事物的相遇一样，我们的感知涉及与仅仅是可能的事物的相遇。尽管我们的模态信念所提出的哲学问题的紧迫性，模态知识的哲学研究-模态认识论-是相对不发达的。因此，这是一个非常肥沃的领域，为新的研究基本问题。我自己的工作将调查我们的想象力在产生关于什么是可能的信念中所扮演的角色所产生的问题。例如，我的研究的一部分将研究我们的想象力，就像我们的感官能力一样，产生独特类型的外观，而另一部分将研究我们想象虚构人物的明显能力的哲学后果。