Lying, Misleading and What is Said

说谎和误导之间的区别是非常自然的。一个人开枪打死了父母，然后打电话给警察，说“有人开枪打死了我父母”，这是误导，但他并没有撒谎。关于这一区别的道德意义众说纷纭，但很少有人怀疑它的存在。谎言和误导的区别在于对所说内容的理解。一个人不能撒谎，除非他说了一些虚假的东西（或者至少他认为是虚假的东西）。但是，在语言哲学中，“说什么”这个概念却引起了巨大的争论，有许多相互矛盾的概念在激烈地争论着。一些人坚持认为，所说的话必须是心理上真实的——易于理解，并在说话者的心理生活中发挥着明确的作用。另一些人则认为，这只是一个理论家的概念，在说话者的生活中没有任何意义。但是，无论说谎/误导的区别涉及到什么说法的概念，它显然对普通的说话者具有真正的直觉意义——否则，当我们觉得有必要误导时，为什么我们会很自然地努力寻找一种不是谎言的说法呢？我的项目的一部分将涉及所说内容的概念：首先，我将研究当前的争议，并考虑到说谎/误导的区别，认为没有一个可用的候选人可以做必要的工作来捕捉这种非常直观的区别。接下来，我将提供我自己的说法概念，特别考虑到说谎和误导的区别。我的项目的第二部分是关于说谎/误导区别的伦理意义。正如我所指出的，许多人认为误导比说谎更可取，所以很自然地，人们会努力创作出仅仅是误导而不是说谎的话语。尽管如此，这确实是一个令人困惑的偏好。说谎者和误导者都是故意让别人有一个错误的信念。他们是通过说假话还是说真话来做到这一点又有什么关系呢？人们给出了许多理由，证明宁愿误导也不愿撒谎。我将首先检查这些，记住说的本质。言语的本质在这个伦理问题上出奇地重要，因为把谎言单独挑出来进行特别谴责的论点，往往会转向对言语运作方式的主张。我认为，对沟通方式的密切关注揭示了现有的理由是站不住脚的。尽管如此，我确实认为区分撒谎和误导是有道德意义的。我认为，这种区别的道德意义是合理的，但这需要一个比以前更复杂的交流图景。最后，我将我的调查结果应用于各种著名而有趣的谎言和误导案例，包括克林顿性丑闻，各种其他政治言论，以及一些有趣的历史案例。因此，我的项目使用伦理学的见解来阐明语言意义上的话语概念；它运用语言哲学的见解来阐明说谎和误导之间的道德区别。

The distinction between lying and misleading is an immensely natural one. One who shoots his parents and then phones the police, saying 'Someone shot my parents' has misled, but he has not lied. Opinions vary as to the moral significance of this distinction, but few doubt its existence.The distinction between lying and misleading turns on the notion of what is said. One cannot lie unless one says something false (or at least something one believes to be false). But the notion of what is said is the subject of tremendous controversy in philosophy of language, with many competing notions hotly contested. Some maintain that what is said must be psychologically real-- easily accessible, and playing a clearly defined role in the mental lives of speakers. Others argue that it is merely a theoretician's notion, of no significance in the lives of speakers. But whatever notion of saying is involved in the lying/misleading distinction, it is clearly one of genuine intuitive significance to ordinary speakers-- why else would we find it so natural to struggle for a way of stating something that is not a lie, when we feel the need to mislead? One part of my project will concern the notion of what is said: First, I will examine the current controversy with the lying/misleading distinction in mind, arguing that none of the available candidates can do the work needed to capture this immensely intuitive distinction. Next, I will offer my own conception of saying, specifically formulated with the lying/misleading distinction in mind. The second part of my project concerns the ethical significance of the lying/misleading distinction. As I've noted, many people assume that misleading is preferable to lying, and it is very natural to work hard to craft utterances that merely mislead rather than lie. Nonetheless, this is really quite a puzzling preference. Both the liar and the misleader deliberately work to bring it about that someone else has a false belief. Why should it matter whether they do this by saying something false, or by saying something true? A number of justifications have been given for preferring mere misleading to lying. I will begin by examining these, bearing in mind the nature of saying. The nature of saying turns out to be surprisingly important to this ethical question, because the arguments that single out lying for special condemnation tend to turn on claims about the way that saying works. I will argue that close attention to the ways that communcation works reveals that existing justifications are untenable. Nonetheless, I do think there is moral significance to the distinction between lying and misleading. I will argue that the moral significance of this distinction can be justified, but that this requires a far more complicated picture of communication than has previously been employed.Finally, I apply the results of my investigation to a variety of famous and interesting cases of lying and misleading, including the Clinton sex scandal, various other political utterances, and some interesting historical cases.My project, then, uses insights from ethics to shed light on the linguistically significant notion of what is said; and it uses insights from philosophy of language to shed light on the moral distinction between lying and misleading.