Cognitive Alienation. A New Approach to the Problem of Scepticism

认知异化。

• 批准号: AH/F003919/1
• 负责人: Jose Zalabardo
• 金额: $ 2.86万
• 依托单位: University College London
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2008 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FF003919%2F1
• 关键词: Cognitive; Alienation.; New; Approach; Problem

The problem of scepticism in contemporary epistemology is generally construed as a series of seemingly cogent arguments for the conclusion that knowledge is impossible, or that we can have much less knowledge than we might have thought. However, recent work on the nature of knowledge has shown that these arguments rely on premises that we have independent reason to reject -- premises that postulate necessary conditions for knowledge that are not in line with our everyday understanding of the concept.Most contemporary epistemologists conclude from this that the problem of scepticism should be regarded as solved, since the impression that the problem was real has been exposed as arising from a mistaken conception of the nature of knowledge.The proposed research is based on the hypothesis that this is the wrong conclusion to draw -- that the problem is real and important, but that it should not be construed as targeting the possibility of knowledge. Rather, it should be construed as a problem that we would face even if we had as much knowledge as we think we have.My main goal is to develop the alternative construal of the problem of scepticism that this hypothesis calls for. I intend to show that the problem raised by traditional sceptical arguments should be construed as concerning, not whether knowledge is possible, but whether we can succeed in seeing ourselves in a position to determine the extent to which our cognitive efforts approximate the goal of truth. 'Cognitive alienation' is the label that I use for the situation in which we find ourselves when we realise that we cannot succeed in this enterprise of cognitive self-assessment.I intend to develop this construal by studying the parallels between cognition and other goal-oriented activities, arguing that our situation with respect to cognition is analogous to our situation in areas of activity where we don't see ourselves in a position to determine the extent to which we achieve our goals.The study of these parallels will also cast light on the peculiar features of the relationship between cognition and the goal of truth -- the fact that it doesn't seem possible to engage in the activity without aiming at this particular goal and the impression that we are incapable of reaching the conclusion that we haven't achieved it.With this construal of the problem I hope to vindicate the widespread suspicion that contemporary solutions to the problem of scepticism miss their intended target -- that the problem is left intact by the discovery that sceptical arguments against the possibility of knowledge are based on mistaken claims about what is required for knowledge.My construal will also sustain a new approach to the traditional line of reasoning according to which the problem of scepticism poses a serious obstacle to realist positions that insist on the radical independence between reality and the cognitive practices in which we seek to gain access to it. The new construal of the problem will enable us to get a clearer picture of the precise version of realism that comes under pressure from sceptical reasoning.

当代认识论中的怀疑论问题通常被解释为一系列看似令人信服的论点，以证明知识是不可能的，或者我们可以拥有比我们想象的少得多的知识。然而，最近关于知识本质的研究表明，这些论点依赖于我们有独立理由拒绝的前提--这些前提假定了知识的必要条件，而这些条件与我们对知识概念的日常理解不一致。大多数当代认识论者由此得出结论，怀疑论的问题应该被视为已经解决，因为这个问题是真实的的印象已经被暴露出来，因为它是由对知识本质的错误观念引起的。拟议的研究基于这样的假设：这是得出的错误结论--这个问题是真实的且重要的，但它不应被解释为针对知识的可能性。相反，它应该被解释为一个问题，即使我们拥有我们认为我们拥有的那么多知识，我们也会面临这个问题。我的主要目标是发展这个假设所要求的怀疑论问题的替代概念。我打算表明，传统怀疑论论证所提出的问题，不应被解释为关于知识是否可能，而应被解释为关于我们是否能够成功地看到自己处于一种位置，以确定我们的认知努力在多大程度上接近真理的目标。“认知异化”是我用来描述当我们意识到自己无法在认知自我评估的事业中取得成功时所发现的情况的标签。我打算通过研究认知和其他目标导向活动之间的相似之处来发展这种联系，认为我们在认知方面的情况类似于我们在活动领域的情况，在这些领域我们看不到自己处于一个位置，决定了我们达到目标的程度。对这些相似之处的研究也将揭示认知与真理目标之间关系的特殊特征--事实上，如果不瞄准这个特定的目标，似乎就不可能从事这项活动，而且我们无法得出我们没有实现目标的结论的印象。为了证明普遍的怀疑，即当代解决怀疑主义问题的办法没有达到预期的目标，我的结论还将支持对传统推理路线的一种新的方法，根据这种方法，怀疑论问题构成了一个严重的障碍现实主义立场坚持现实与我们试图接近现实的认知实践之间的根本独立性。对问题的新理解将使我们能够更清楚地了解在怀疑论推理的压力下出现的现实主义的精确版本。