Social Security Privatization: Investment Choice and Field Experiments in Mexico

描述（由申请人提供）：社会保障改革是全球经济和政策辩论中最紧迫的问题之一。取代现收现付制度的潜在收益取决于私有化在效率和投资回报方面的收益。然而，在任何产品市场中，消费者和企业的基本行为决定了市场效率。该项目将研究墨西哥私有化社会保障体系中的工人如何选择投资基金，以及消费者行为对企业之间竞争、均衡费用和效率的影响。通过与墨西哥社会保障管理机构conar的独特合作，我获得了前所未有的访问系统中每个个人退休账户的管理数据的权限。首先，我将使用这些数据来估计工人基金选择（需求）决定因素的灵活离散选择模型，以及不同人口统计数据的消费者如何愿意权衡基金特征，如负荷费、余额费、过去的回报、品牌名称和便利性（例如，银行分行附近）。然后，我将使用需求估计来检查墨西哥养老基金市场的高均衡费用是否由于公司的非弹性需求或非竞争行为。其次，我将对随机选择的工人进行家庭调查，以收集关键人口统计信息，如教育、储蓄行为和金融素养的衡量标准。我将把调查数据与行政数据联系起来，以检验这些人口统计数据如何影响工人的选择。此外，该调查将嵌入实地实验，以测试工人的基金选择如何随着透明的费用信息和简短的金融概念教程（例如，复利的重要性）而变化。这将使我能够测试低收入工人是否比高收入工人更不关注费用，因为他们面临更高的信息或决策成本，以及简单的政策干预是否可以降低信息成本并减少他们支付的管理费。该项目将汇集独特的数据集和各种实证技术，以全面了解影响工人如何选择基金、基金经理如何选择管理费的因素，以及私有化社会保障体系对退休后财富分配的影响。公共卫生相关性：本研究项目使用来自墨西哥社会保障系统的数据来研究工人如何选择投资基金，基金经理如何选择管理费，以及在私有化的社会保障系统中对退休财富分配的影响。该项目还实施了一项调查和随机实地实验，以检验决策成本和金融知识如何影响工人的基金选择，以及决策者可以采取哪些措施来增加私有化市场中的竞争，以确保来自各种背景的工人都能有足够的资金健康退休。

DESCRIPTION (provided by applicant): Social security reform is one of the most pressing issues in economic and policy debates around the world. The potential gain from replacing a pay-as-you-go system depends on the gains in efficiency and investment returns from privatization. However, as in any product market, the fundamental behavior of consumers and firms determines market efficiency. The project will examine how workers in Mexico's privatized social security system choose investment funds, and the implication of consumer behavior for competition between firms, equilibrium fees and efficiency. Through a unique collaboration with the Mexican social security administration, CONSAR, I have been given unprecedented access to administrative data on every individual retirement account in the system. First, I will use these data to estimate a flexible discrete choice model of the determinants of workers' fund choices (demand) and how consumers of varying demographics are willing to trade-off fund characteristics, such as load fees, balance fees, past returns, brand name, and convenience (e.g., bank branch proximity). I will then use the demand estimates to examine if the high equilibrium fees in the Mexican pension fund market are due to inelastic demand or non-competitive behavior by firms. Second, I will implement a household survey of randomly selected workers to collect information on key demographics such as education, savings behavior, and measures of financial literacy. I will link the survey data back to the administrative data to examine how these demographics influence worker's choices. In addition, the survey will embed field experiments to test how workers' fund choices change with transparent information on fees and brief tutorials on financial concepts (e.g., the importance of compounding). This will allow me to test if low-income workers pay less attention to fees than higher- income workers because they face higher information or decision making costs, and whether a simple policy intervention can lower information costs and decrease the management fees they pay. This project will bring together unique data sets and diverse empirical techniques to gain an integral understanding of the factors that influence how workers choose funds, how fund managers choose management fees, and the implications for the distribution of wealth at retirement in a privatized social security system. PUBLIC HEALTH RELEVANCE: This research project uses data from the Mexican social security system to examine how workers choose investment funds, how fund managers choose management fees, and the implications for the distribution of wealth at retirement in a privatized social security system. The project also implements a survey and a randomized field experiment in order to examine how decision-making costs and financial literacy impact worker's fund choices, and what policy makers can do to increase competition in a privatized market in order to ensure that workers from all backgrounds can have sufficient funds for a healthy retirement.