Disability Shocks, Disability Insurance, and Life Cycle Behavior

描述（由申请人提供）：本研究项目的目标是提供一个框架，以了解美国残疾风险和残疾保险（DI）计划的特征如何在明确的生命周期设置中影响个人消费和劳动力供给行为。我们想用这个框架来分析不同经济环境下的行为。我们的初步数据分析是基于1987-2005年PSID的数据。我们计划将其与其他调查的数据整合起来。最近伤残补助申领人比例的增加和伤残补助计划所占社会保障支出比例的增加，再次呼吁重新设计该计划，旨在减少福利的慷慨程度，增加对残疾定义的严格程度，并总体上降低“道德风险”的程度，即存在不符合资格的个人被纳入该计划。现有的实证文献已经找到了令人信服的证据来证明这种影响（即，残保福利对残保申请或劳动力市场参与的积极影响）。考虑到保险和激励之间的权衡，目前尚不清楚减少福利慷慨程度或增加筛选严格程度（这会降低道德风险）是否一定会提高福利。我们想要改进目前的研究。大多数实证论文采取简化形式的方法，使解决这个问题变得困难。现有的结构论文是基于非常简化的框架。我们提出了一个足够丰富的理论框架，可以放松文献中所做的强烈假设。我们将使用我们的模型来评估各种计划变化对福利的影响：(a)增加残疾测试的“严格性”；(b)改变重新评价的可能性；(c)改变残障给付的累进性；(d)减少残疾人的工作费用。其他的也会被考虑。评估这些变化对福利的影响的能力具有重要的政策意义。它们被明确认为是解决过去二十年来残保人数扩大背后的道德风险问题的可能办法。预计残障保险的扩大对整个社会保障体系的未来及其长期可持续性具有重要影响。公共卫生相关性：本研究项目的目标是提供一个一致的框架，以理解美国残疾风险和残疾保险（DI）计划的特征如何在明确的生命周期设置中影响个人消费和劳动力供给行为。我们的框架可用于评估残障补贴计划拟议改革的有效性，例如改变残障补贴评估测试的严格程度、改变残障补贴重新评估的概率、改变残障补贴计算公式的累进性、引入残障补贴资格资产测试、降低残障人士的工作成本和/或提高残障补贴受益人获得工作机会的比率。鉴于申请残保的人数比例不断增加，残保方案在社会保障支出中所占比例不断增加，该项目具有明显的公共卫生相关性。

DESCRIPTION (provided by applicant): The goal of this research project is to provide a framework for understanding how disability risk and the features of the Disability Insurance (DI) program in the US affect individual consumption and labor supply behavior in an explicit life-cycle setting. We want to use this framework to analyze behavior in alternative economic environments. Our preliminary data analysis is based on data from 1987-2005 PSID. We plan to integrate it with data from other surveys. The recent increase in the proportion of DI claimants and the proportion of Social Security spending taken up by the DI program have renewed the calls for a redesign of the program aimed at reducing benefits generosity, increasing strictness in the definition of disability, and in general reducing the extent of "moral hazard" - i.e., the existence of undeserving individuals being admitted into the program. The existing empirical literature has found convincing evidence of such effects (i.e., as a positive effect of DI benefits on DI application or labor market participation). Given the trade-off between insurance and incentives, it's not clear that a reduction in benefits generosity or an increase in screening stringency (which lowers moral hazard) is necessarily welfare enhancing. We want to improve on current studies. Most empirical papers take a reduced form approach that make addressing this question difficult. The existing structural papers are based on very simplified frameworks. We propose a theoretical framework that is rich enough to allow relaxing the strong assumptions made in the literature. We will use our model to evaluate the welfare effect of various program changes: (a) Increasing the "strictness" of the disability test; (b) Changing the probability of re-assessment; (c) Changing the progressivity of DI payments; (d) reducing the cost of work for the disabled. Others will be considered. The ability to evaluate the welfare effect of these changes has important policy implications. They have been explicitly considered as possible solutions to the moral hazard problem underlying the expansion of DI rolls of the last two decades. The forecast expansion of DI has important implications for the future of the Social Security system as a whole and for its long-term sustainability. PUBLIC HEALTH RELEVANCE: The goal of this research project is to provide a consistent framework for understanding how disability risk and the features of the Disability Insurance (DI) program in the US affect individual consumption and labor supply behavior in an explicit life-cycle setting. Our framework can be used to assess the effectiveness of proposed reforms of the DI program, such as changing the strictness of the tests used to assess disability, changing the probability of re-assessment for DI, changing the progressivity of the formula used to compute DI benefits, introducing an asset test for DI eligibility, and reducing the cost of work for the disabled and/or increasing the arrival rate of job offers for DI beneficiaries. Given the growing proportion of people claiming DI and the proportion of Social Security spending taken up by the DI program, this project has clear public health relevance.