Disability Shocks, Disability Insurance, and Life Cycle Behavior

残疾冲击、残疾保险和生命周期行为

• 批准号: 7915572
• 负责人: Luigi Pistaferri
• 金额: $ 9.23万
• 依托单位: STANFORD UNIVERSITY
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-08-15 至 2012-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://reporter.nih.gov/project-details/7915572
• 关键词: Accounting; Address; Adopted; Affect; Age; Behavior; Cessation of life; Consumption; Data; Data Analyses; Data Set; Development; Disability Insurance; Disabled Persons; Disadvantaged; Disincentive; Economics; Effectiveness; Eligibility Determination; Employment; Environment; Equilibrium; Evaluation; Face; Floor; Food; Friction; Future; Goals; Government; Government Financing; Hand; Head; Health; Health Status; Incentives; Income; Individual; Insurance; Insurance Benefits; Label; Life Cycle Stages; Literature; Marketing; Measurement; Measures; Modeling; Morals; National Health Interview Survey; Nature; Occupations; Pain Measurement; Pain Threshold; Paper; Policies; Probability; Process; Productivity; Records; Relative (related person); Reporting; Research Project Grants; Retirement; Risk; Sampling; Savings; Screening procedure; Shock; Social Security; Social Welfare; Solutions; Source; Surveys; System; Taxes; Terminology; Testing; Textbooks; Unemployment; Wages; Weight; Woman; Work; aged; base; beneficiary; cohort; consumption measures; cost; disability; hazard; improved; interest; male; men; novel; payment; policy implication; preference; programs; public health relevance; research study; response; retiree; skills; trend; unemployment insurance; working men

DESCRIPTION (provided by applicant): The goal of this research project is to provide a framework for understanding how disability risk and the features of the Disability Insurance (DI) program in the US affect individual consumption and labor supply behavior in an explicit life-cycle setting. We want to use this framework to analyze behavior in alternative economic environments. Our preliminary data analysis is based on data from 1987-2005 PSID. We plan to integrate it with data from other surveys. The recent increase in the proportion of DI claimants and the proportion of Social Security spending taken up by the DI program have renewed the calls for a redesign of the program aimed at reducing benefits generosity, increasing strictness in the definition of disability, and in general reducing the extent of "moral hazard" - i.e., the existence of undeserving individuals being admitted into the program. The existing empirical literature has found convincing evidence of such effects (i.e., as a positive effect of DI benefits on DI application or labor market participation). Given the trade-off between insurance and incentives, it's not clear that a reduction in benefits generosity or an increase in screening stringency (which lowers moral hazard) is necessarily welfare enhancing. We want to improve on current studies. Most empirical papers take a reduced form approach that make addressing this question difficult. The existing structural papers are based on very simplified frameworks. We propose a theoretical framework that is rich enough to allow relaxing the strong assumptions made in the literature. We will use our model to evaluate the welfare effect of various program changes: (a) Increasing the "strictness" of the disability test; (b) Changing the probability of re-assessment; (c) Changing the progressivity of DI payments; (d) reducing the cost of work for the disabled. Others will be considered. The ability to evaluate the welfare effect of these changes has important policy implications. They have been explicitly considered as possible solutions to the moral hazard problem underlying the expansion of DI rolls of the last two decades. The forecast expansion of DI has important implications for the future of the Social Security system as a whole and for its long-term sustainability. PUBLIC HEALTH RELEVANCE: The goal of this research project is to provide a consistent framework for understanding how disability risk and the features of the Disability Insurance (DI) program in the US affect individual consumption and labor supply behavior in an explicit life-cycle setting. Our framework can be used to assess the effectiveness of proposed reforms of the DI program, such as changing the strictness of the tests used to assess disability, changing the probability of re-assessment for DI, changing the progressivity of the formula used to compute DI benefits, introducing an asset test for DI eligibility, and reducing the cost of work for the disabled and/or increasing the arrival rate of job offers for DI beneficiaries. Given the growing proportion of people claiming DI and the proportion of Social Security spending taken up by the DI program, this project has clear public health relevance.

描述（由申请人提供）：本研究项目的目标是提供一个框架，以了解残疾风险和残疾保险（DI）计划在美国的特点如何影响个人消费和劳动力供应行为在一个明确的生命周期设置。我们想用这个框架来分析替代经济环境中的行为。我们的初步数据分析是基于1987-2005年PSID的数据。我们计划将其与其他调查的数据相结合。最近DI索赔人比例的增加和DI计划所占社会保障支出的比例再次呼吁重新设计该计划，旨在减少福利慷慨，增加残疾定义的严格性，并在总体上减少“道德风险”的程度-即，不值得的人被允许进入该计划的存在。现有的经验文献已经找到了这种效应的令人信服的证据（即，作为直接投资利益对直接投资申请或劳动力市场参与的积极影响）。考虑到保险和激励之间的权衡，目前还不清楚减少福利慷慨或增加筛选严格性（降低道德风险）是否一定会提高福利。我们希望改进目前的研究。大多数实证论文采取简化形式的方法，使解决这个问题变得困难。现有的结构文件是基于非常简化的框架。我们提出了一个理论框架，这是足够丰富的，以允许放松在文献中提出的强有力的假设。我们将使用我们的模型来评估各种计划变化的福利效果：（a）增加残疾测试的“严格性”;（B）改变重新评估的概率;（c）改变DI支付的累进性;（d）降低残疾人的工作成本。其他人将被考虑。评估这些变化的福利影响的能力具有重要的政策意义。它们被明确认为是过去二十年来直接投资卷扩大所导致的道德风险问题的可能解决方案。预计直接投资的扩大对整个社会保障制度的未来及其长期可持续性具有重要影响。公共卫生相关性：本研究项目的目标是提供一个一致的框架，以了解残疾风险和残疾保险（DI）计划在美国的特点如何影响个人消费和劳动力供应行为在一个明确的生命周期设置。我们的框架可用于评估DI计划拟议改革的有效性，例如改变用于评估残疾的测试的严格性，改变DI重新评估的概率，改变用于计算DI福利的公式的累进性，引入DI资格的资产测试，降低残疾人的工作成本和/或提高残疾人保险受益人获得工作机会的比率。考虑到越来越多的人要求DI和DI计划所占的社会保障支出比例，该项目具有明显的公共卫生相关性。