The intrinsic cost of cognitive control: Neural foundations and behavioral impact

描述(由申请者提供)：一个由来已久的观点是，认知过程主观上是昂贵的：在其他条件相同的情况下，人们会选择最大限度地减少认知需求的策略或行动。这一原理被认为可以解释广泛的决策现象，但令人惊讶的是，它几乎没有受到直接的实验审查。在最近的工作中，我们在纠正这一问题上走了一段路，为认知需求避免提供了第一个直接证据。我们最初的行为发现将认知成本与对执行功能或受控信息处理的需求联系在一起。与此一致，我们获得了神经成像结果，将认知成本与中枢参与的皮质区域联系起来 执行控制。在目前的应用中，我们的目标是在这个最初的基础上构建一个更全面的关于控制成本在决策制定中所起的作用以及相关神经过程的说明。拟议的实验使用行为、神经成像和遗传技术来追求三个具体目标：1)我们的目标是评估控制成本的更广泛的决策后果。使用个体差异方法，我们建议在两个特别重要的领域测试控制成本的参与：a.对跨期选择的研究表明，“自我控制”在抵抗即时回报的诱惑方面发挥了作用。我们的目标是检验这样一种假设，即这种克制会带来控制成本，这可能解释了为什么在跨期选择中的自我控制容易偶尔失败。B.在决策中使用启发式方法被认为是基于努力最小化的原则。我们建议通过检验启发式使用和认知需求回避之间的相关性来评估这一假设。2)进一步探讨控制成本的神经基础。特别是，我们将调查控制成本与先前工作的两个关键发现之间的关系：a.先前的研究揭示了多巴胺在决定是否愿意付出体力努力方面的核心作用。使用行为遗传学方法，我们的目标是调查多巴胺能功能是否在认知努力的情况下起到相关的作用。神经成像研究显示，支持认知控制的大脑皮层区域与“默认模式网络”一起运作。在将控制成本计算与控制相关领域联系起来后，我们提出了新的神经成像工作，旨在调查默认网络在形成基于成本的决策过程中的潜在参与。3)我们的目标是测试一种基于经济劳动力供应理论的成本敏感决策的新经济模型，该理论最初是为了解释劳动力市场中的努力分配而开发的正式框架。初步实验表明，劳动力供给理论可能为理解控制成本在基于报酬的决策中的作用提供了一个强有力的工具。我们建议将这一初步工作扩展到解决两个悬而未决的问题：a.认知需求回避是否源于纯粹的反应机制，或者决策是否主动预测控制需求？劳动力供给模型能解释控制权分配随时间的变化，包括所谓的“自我耗尽”效应吗？

DESCRIPTION (provided by applicant): It is a longstanding idea that cognitive processing is subjectively costly: All else being equal, people will choose strategies or actions that minimize cognitive demands. This principle has been presumed to explain a wide array of decision-making phenomena, but has been subjected to surprisingly little direct experimental scrutiny. In recent work, we have gone some distance toward rectifying this, providing the first direct evidence for cognitive demand avoidance. Our initial behavioral findings link cognitive costs to demands on executive function or controlled information processing. Consistent with this, we have obtained neuroimaging results that tie cognitive costs to cortical areas centrally involved in executive control. In the present application, our objective is to build on this initial foundation constructing a fuller account of the role that control costs play in decision making, and of the relevant neural processes. The proposed experiments employ behavioral, neuroimaging and genetic techniques to pursue three specific aims: 1) We aim to evaluate the broader decision-making ramifications of control costs. Using an individual-differences approach, we propose to test for the involvement of control costs in two particularly important areas: A. Research on intertemporal choice has suggested a role for 'self-control' in resisting the temptation of immediate rewards. We aim to test the hypothesis that such forbearance carries control costs, potentially explaining why self-control in intertemporal choice is prone to occasional failure. B. Heuristic use in decision making has been proposed to arise from an effort-minimization principle. We propose to evaluate this hypothesis, by testing for a correlation between heuristic use and cognitive demand avoidance. 2) We aim to further probe the neural foundations of control costs. In particular, we will investigate the relationship between control costs and two key findings from previous work: A. Previous research has revealed a central role for dopamine in determining willingness to exert physical effort. Using a behavioral-genetic approach, we aim to investigate whether dopaminergic function plays a related role in the case of cognitive effort. B. Neuroimaging research has revealed that cortical areas supporting cognitive control operate alongside a 'default mode network.' Having linked control-cost computations with the control-related areas, we propose new neuroimaging work aimed at investigating the potential involvement of the default network in shaping cost-based decision making. 3) We aim to test a novel economic model of cost-sensitive decision making based on economic labor supply theory, a formal framework originally developed to account for effort allocation in labor markets. Initial experiments suggest that labor supply theory may provide a powerful tool for understanding the role of control costs in reward-based decision making. We propose to extend this initial work to address two outstanding questions: A. Does cognitive demand avoidance arise from a purely reactive mechanism, or does decision making actively anticipate demands for control? B. Can the labor-supply model account for shifts in control allocation over time, including so-called 'ego-depletion' effects?