"Dissociating belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recall within autobiographical memory: Conceptual refinement and experimental manipulation"

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Much of the time, recollecting events and believing that events occurred in the past happen together. Memories are typically believed, and the study of autobiographical recollection is often the study of believed memories. Yet recent work shows that autobiographical belief can occur without recollection. Work on false memories and non-remembered autobiographical events shows that autobiographical beliefs frequently occur in the absence of memory. Research on non-believed memories, memories that were formerly but are no longer believed, shows that recollection can also exceed belief. Other theory and research shows that recollection and belief in the accuracy of recall (via confidence) are also conceptually distinct. However, belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recall have yet to be theoretically and empirically distinguished simultaneously. This research program will, 1) test structural models in which belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recollection are theorized to represent distinct latent variables, using appropriate event cueing methods that are developed; 2) experimentally create and manipulate non-believed memories in the laboratory; and 3) conduct the first exploratory neuroimaging study of the distinction between belief in occurrence and recollection. Cumulatively, these studies will establish the degree to which distinguishing belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in reollection challenges previous conceptualizations of the structure and function of autobiographical memory. Dissociations between processes such as those under investigation may lead to revisions of theories about exactly what is being reported when people indicated that they are remembering. Should the proposed dissociations emerge through this research, established approaches to memory may require revision in order to accommodate the distinction between evaluations of the truth of event occurrence versus the presence of memory-like mental simulations that may or may not indiate events happened in the past.