Neural and cognitive bases of intentional action, conscious awareness and agency

可以根据环境的变化采取行动，例如，在门铃响起时开门，也可以在没有环境变化的情况下采取行动，比如离家时开门。从历史上看，对人类行为的研究集中在前一类行为(即反应)上，因此，我们对支配故意行为的过程的理解不够完整。另一个鲜为人知的故意行为领域涉及到我们对所做行为的有意识意识，以及对这些行为的代理感(作者感觉)。早期的科学心理学家非常重视对主观心理状态的本质及其神经生理学基础的理解，詹姆斯和冯特等早期先驱的主要著作中有大量章节致力于意识的各个方面(詹姆斯，1890；冯特，1874)。然而，行为主义的兴起导致这些问题多年来一直被忽视。然而最近，意识研究再次占据了中心舞台(Lamme，2006；Haynes&Rees，2006；Rees，2007)。然而，尽管最近的工作重新兴起，但仍有许多我们不理解的东西，特别是在有意行动、有意识的意识和代理的背景下。这项申请概述了将解决我们集体知识中的这种匮乏的实验。有两个项目，一个与调节意向性运动准备的机制有关，另一个专注于产生有意识的行动经验的信号，以及影响代理感(SOA)的因素。这两个项目将使用各种技术，包括主观报告和反应时间等行为测量方法，功能磁共振成像(FMRI)等神经成像方法，以及经颅磁刺激(TMS)等神经干预方法。我的目标是构建一个意向行为的神经表征的描述，阐明行动的意识是如何产生的，并提高我们对产生我们的SOA的各种因素的理解。

Actions can be made in response to changes in the environment, like for example, opening a door in response to the doorbell, or they can be made in the absence of environmental changes, like opening the door when leaving home. Historically, the study of human action has concentrated on the former class of actions (i.e., reactions), and as a result, our understanding of the processes governing intentional action is less complete. Another area of intentional action that is poorly understood relates to our conscious awareness of the actions we make and the sense of agency (feelings of authorship) for these actions. Early scientific psychologists placed great emphasis on understanding the nature of subjective mental states and their neurophysiological basis, and major works by early pioneers such as James and Wundt contained large sections devoted to various facets of consciousness (James, 1890; Wundt, 1874). The rise of behaviourism, however, led to a neglect of these issues for many years. Recently though, the study of consciousness has again taken centre stage (Lamme, 2006; Haynes & Rees, 2006; Rees, 2007). However, despite this recent resurgence of work, there is much that we don't understand, especially in the context of intentional action, conscious awareness and agency. This application outlines experiments that will address this dearth in our collective knowledge. There are two projects, one concerned with the mechanisms that mediate intentional motor preparation, and another focusing on the signals that give rise of conscious experience of action, and the factors that affect the sense of agency (SoA). Both projects will use a variety of techniques including behavioural measures such as subjective reports and reaction time, neuroimaging methods such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and neural intervention such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). My aims are to construct an account of the neural representation of intentional actions, to shed light on how conscious awareness of action arises, and to improve our understanding of the various factors that produce our SoA.