Mechanism Design for a Sustainable Supply Chain Management

可持续供应链管理的机制设计

• 批准号: RGPIN-2014-04626
• 负责人: Gumus, Mehmet
• 金额: $ 1.46万
• 依托单位: McGill University
• 依托单位国家: 加拿大
• 项目类别: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 加拿大
• 起止时间: 2018-01-01 至 2019-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nserc-crsng.gc.ca/ase-oro/Details-Detailles_eng.asp?id=652665
• 关键词: Mechanism; Design; Sustainable; Supply; Chain

Supply chain management (SCM) lies at the core of globalization forces that flattened the world over the last decade. That being said, siloed approach to managing supply chain systems that drive economic development and growth has led us down a dangerous path toward unsustainable prosperity. This problem is especially exacerbated due to the increasing degrees of information asymmetry, demand and supply risks and agency costs, all of which prevent the supply chains from reaching to their full potentials. Due to the emergence of complex problems such as climate change, and overexploitation of natural resources, we are on the verge of creating a society ill-suited to the needs and limits of both natural resources and environment. To summarize, current contracts, policies and mechanisms fail to provide a balanced perspective necessary for a sustainable SCM, which can no longer be ruled by a single objective and single mechanism-designer but by multiple objectives and complex interactions among multiple mechanism designers. Hence, in this research program, we intend to develop and analyze a framework that considers a supply chain as a nexus of contracts designed by multiple stakeholders, be they suppliers and retailers who put more emphasis on cost minimization or profit maximization and regulators, government agencies and NGOs which put more emphasis on operational sustainability and ensure the compliance of the internal supply chain members to the environmental considerations. * This research proposal is for a 5-year integrative program for modeling and developing multi-lateral mechanisms so as to guide future policy and investments in these systems with the goal of attaining sustainable prosperity. Building upon the applicant's current work in SCM in the presence of asymmetric information combined with recent developments in the theory of incentives with multi-principal and multi-agent systems, the program examines the full path from sustainability to information and risk management in supply chains. *The objectives of the research program are, in the short term:*- To develop a multi-principal multi-agent framework for a sustainable SCM, where the principals (e.g., regulators, buyers and suppliers, etc.) may have conflicting design objectives for the ultimate supply chain system and where the agents (e.g., upstream and downstream firms) have varying cost, risk and informational characteristics,*- To design efficient and optimal mechanisms that are implementable, i.e., that would take into account both profit-maximization (or cost-minimization) incentives of internal supply chain actors and sustainability objectives of external players,*and in the long term:*- To develop computationally tractable mechanisms by focusing on a combination of structured supply chain contracts (e.g., risk-, revenue- and cost-sharing incentives) and regulatory mechanisms (e.g., audit- and market-based incentives) and analyze their structural properties and performances in terms of efficiency and optimality,*- Finally, to evaluate the agency costs for the supply chains plagued with asymmetric information and to explore the role of information-sharing in achieving efficiency and and/or optimality.*Supply chain systems are the lifeblood of the economy and those innovations that are transforming them are here to stay in the near future. Success in sustainably harnessing the potential of these systems so as to serve the society most effectively would require a holistic approach that takes into account interdependencies between the various internal as well as external actors. This research will be among the first to develop such an integrated framework to help researchers analyze the contract design problem for a sustainable SCM.

供应链管理（SCM）是全球化力量的核心，在过去的十年里，全球化力量使世界变得扁平。话虽如此，推动经济发展和增长的供应链系统的孤立管理方法已将我们引向一条通往不可持续繁荣的危险道路。由于信息不对称、供求风险和代理成本的增加，这一问题尤其严重，所有这些都阻碍了供应链充分发挥其潜力。由于气候变化和过度开发自然资源等复杂问题的出现，我们即将建立一个不适应自然资源和环境需求和限制的社会。总之，目前的合同，政策和机制未能提供一个可持续的供应链管理所需的平衡的角度来看，它不能再由一个单一的目标和单一的机制设计者，而是由多个目标和多个机制设计者之间的复杂互动。因此，在这项研究计划中，我们打算开发和分析一个框架，将供应链视为由多个利益相关者设计的合同联系，无论是更强调成本最小化或利润最大化的供应商和零售商，还是更强调运营可持续性并确保内部供应链成员遵守环境考虑的监管机构，政府机构和非政府组织。* 该研究计划是一项为期5年的综合计划，旨在建立和发展多边机制，以指导未来的政策和投资，实现可持续繁荣的目标。基于申请人目前在供应链管理中的工作，结合信息不对称以及多主体和多代理系统激励理论的最新发展，该计划研究了从可持续发展到供应链信息和风险管理的完整路径。* 研究计划的目标是，在短期内：*-为可持续的SCM开发一个多主体多代理框架，其中主体（例如，监管机构、买方和供应商等）对于最终的供应链系统可能具有冲突的设计目标并且其中代理（例如，上游和下游企业）具有不同的成本、风险和信息特征，*-设计可实施的有效和最佳机制，即，这将考虑到内部供应链参与者的利润最大化（或成本最小化）激励措施和外部参与者的可持续性目标，* 从长远来看：*-通过侧重于结构化供应链合同的组合（例如，风险、收入和成本分摊激励措施）和监管机制（例如，审计和基于市场的激励），并分析其结构特性和绩效的效率和最优性，*-最后，评估代理成本的供应链困扰与不对称信息，并探讨信息共享在实现效率和/或最优性的作用。供应链系统是经济的命脉，而那些正在改变它们的创新将在不久的将来继续存在。要成功地可持续地利用这些系统的潜力，以便最有效地为社会服务，就需要采取一种考虑到内部和外部各行为体之间相互依存关系的整体办法。这项研究将是第一个开发这样一个综合框架，以帮助研究人员分析可持续供应链管理的合同设计问题。