课题基金 / 基金详情

Game theoretic models in supply chains

Game theoretic models in supply chains
供应链中的博弈论模型
批准号:
RGPIN-2020-05156
负责人:
Karray, Salma
金额:
$1.89万
依托单位国家:
加拿大
项目类别:
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
财政年份:
2020
资助国家:
加拿大
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2020-01-01 至 2021-12-31

项目摘要

项目成果

Karray, Salma的其他基金

相似基金

相关文献

中文摘要
翻译
供应链(SC)企业努力协调他们的行动,以获得整个系统的最大性能的目标。然而,这种努力受到来自横向的竞争压力的威胁(例如,零售商之间)和垂直(例如,该研究计划开发了新的数学模型,并应用博弈论分析,以解决关键的管理问题,供应链相关的协调,规划和实施的营销决策在竞争环境中。 静态和动态博弈论分析将被用来描述均衡解决方案的营销决策变量在供应链的背景下。非合作博弈将被解决,纳什或顺序(例如,Stackelberg)平衡解。对于动态和微分博弈,将优先考虑闭环和反馈信息结构,提供子博弈完美的解决方案。还将进行敏感性分析,以探讨模型的参数如何影响均衡策略。在适当的情况下,将比较不同游戏/场景的收益和决策,以研究业务流程、市场条件和竞争进入的变化的影响。结果的计算将根据模型的复杂性通过分析或数值算法进行。研究生将接受商业(营销和SC管理)和运筹学(优化和博弈论)的培训,以帮助完成该计划。 这项研究将通过建立新的模型来促进现有的知识,这些模型考虑了营销决策变量,竞争互动和对SC的动态影响。迄今为止,大多数研究都使用一维和静态模型研究了复杂的SC问题,这些模型专注于单一决策变量(例如,价格,生产,促销)或忽略这些变量对公司利润的未来影响。这种模式是短视和僵化的,而不是有利于供应链长期利益的综合系统。因此,至关重要的是建立新的模型,更准确地表示复杂的商业环境中,公司经营,以建议有用的战略,如何在市场上有效地竞争和合作。 该计划还将提高对营销决策如何影响供应链关系和运营的理解,这可以显着提高该领域的知识并改善商业实践,从而帮助加拿大的经济发展。从这项研究的见解可以帮助提高性能和降低成本的SC公司,从而指导加拿大公司在提高其在全球市场上的竞争地位。它们还将有助于政府机构评估竞争对市场动态和消费者福利的影响。
英文摘要
Supply chain (SC) firms strive to coordinate their actions with the objective of obtaining maximum performance for the whole system. However, such efforts are threatened by competitive pressures originating at the horizontal (e.g., between retailers) and vertical (e.g., between manufacturers and retailers) levels of the SC. This research program develops new mathematical models and applies game-theoretic analysis to solve key managerial problems for supply chains related to the coordination, planning, and implementation of marketing decisions in competitive settings. Both static and dynamic game-theoretic analysis will be used to characterize equilibrium solutions for marketing decision variables in the SC context. Non-cooperative games will be solved and Nash or sequential (e.g., Stackelberg) equilibrium solutions will be obtained. For dynamic and differential games, preference will be given to closed-loop and feedback information structures that provide subgame perfect solutions. Sensitivity analyses will also be conducted to explore how the models' parameters affect equilibrium strategies. When appropriate, payoffs and decisions from different games/scenarios will be compared to study the influence of changes in business processes, market conditions and competitive entries. The computation of results will be conducted analytically or by numerical algorithms depending on the complexity of the model. Graduate students will be trained both in Business (marketing and SC management) and in Operations Research (optimization and game theory) to help complete this program. This research will advance existing knowledge by building new models that account for the impacts of marketing decision variables, competitive interactions, and dynamic effects on SC. Most research to date has studied complex SC problems using one-dimensional and static models focused on single-decision variables (e.g., price, production, promotion) or that ignore the future impact of these variables on the firms' profits. Such models are myopic and rigid, rather than integrated systems benefiting the long-term interests of the supply chain. It is therefore crucial to build new models that are more accurate representations of the complex business environment in which firms operate in order to recommend helpful strategies about how to compete and cooperate effectively in the marketplace. This program will also improve understanding of how marketing decisions can influence supply chain relationships and operations, which can significantly advance knowledge in the field and improve business practice, and thus help Canada's economic development. Insights from this research can help boost performance and reduce costs for SC firms, thereby guiding Canadian companies in improving their competitive position in global markets. They will also be helpful for governmental agencies in assessing competition effects on market dynamics and consumer welfare.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Game theoretic models in supply chains
Game theoretic models in supply chains
Game-theoretic models for competitive supply chains
Building an analytics framework for predicting customer default****
海外基金