Game-theoretic models for competitive supply chains

竞争性供应链的博弈论模型

• 批准号: RGPIN-2015-03880
• 负责人: Karray, Salma
• 金额: $ 1.46万
• 依托单位: University of Ontario Institute of Technology
• 依托单位国家: 加拿大
• 项目类别: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 加拿大
• 起止时间: 2019-01-01 至 2020-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nserc-crsng.gc.ca/ase-oro/Details-Detailles_eng.asp?id=677164
• 关键词: Game; theoretic; models; competitive; supply

Supply chain (SC) firms strive to coordinate their actions with the objective of obtaining maximum performance for the whole system. However, such efforts are threatened by competitive pressures originating at the horizontal (e.g., between retailers) and vertical (e.g., between manufacturers and retailers) levels of the SC. This research program develops new mathematical models that solve key managerial problems for supply chains related to the coordination, planning, and implementation of marketing decisions in competitive settings. ******Game theory is the main methodology for this research program. Both static and dynamic games will be used to characterize equilibrium solutions for marketing decision variables. Non-cooperative games will be solved and Nash or sequential (e.g., Stackelberg) equilibrium solutions will be obtained. For dynamic and differential games, preference will be given to closed-loop and feedback information structures that provide subgame perfect solutions. Sensitivity analyses will also be conducted to explore how the models' parameters affect equilibrium strategies. When appropriate, payoffs and decisions from different games/scenarios will be compared to study the influence of changes in business processes, market conditions, and competitive entries. The computation of results will be conducted analytically or by numerical algorithms depending on the complexity of the model. Undergraduate and graduate students will be trained in marketing, SC management and game theory to help complete this program.***This research will advance existing knowledge by building new models that account for the impacts of marketing decision variables, competitive interactions, and dynamic effects on SC. Most research to date has studied complex SC problems using one-dimensional and static models focused on single-decision variables (e.g., price, production, promotion) or that ignore the future impact of these variables on the firms' profits. Such models are myopic and rigid, rather than integrated systems benefiting the long-term interests of the supply chain. It is therefore crucial to build new mathematical models that are more accurate representations of the complex business environment in which firms operate in order to generate helpful strategic recommendation about how to compete and cooperate effectively in the marketplace.***This program will also improve understanding of how marketing decisions can influence supply chain relationships and operations, which can significantly improve business practice, and thus help Canada's economic development. Insights from this research can help boost performance and reduce costs for SC firms, thereby guiding Canadian companies in improving their competitive position in global markets. They will also be helpful for governmental agencies in assessing competition effects on market dynamics and consumers' welfare.

供应链(SC)企业努力协调他们的行动，以获得整个系统的最大绩效为目标。然而，这种努力受到来自供应链水平(例如，零售商之间)和垂直(例如，制造商和零售商之间)级别的竞争压力的威胁。这项研究计划开发了新的数学模型，以解决供应链中与竞争环境下的营销决策的协调、规划和实施相关的关键管理问题。*博弈论是本研究项目的主要研究方法。静态博弈和动态博弈都将被用来描述营销决策变量的均衡解。将求解非合作博弈，并将获得纳什或序列(例如，斯塔克尔伯格)均衡解。对于动态博弈和微分博弈，将优先考虑提供子博弈完美解的闭环系统和反馈信息结构。还将进行敏感性分析，以探索模型参数如何影响均衡策略。在适当的情况下，将比较不同游戏/场景的收益和决策，以研究业务流程、市场条件和竞争进入方式变化的影响。根据模型的复杂程度，结果的计算将以解析方式进行或通过数值算法进行。本科生和研究生将接受市场营销、供应链管理和博弈论方面的培训，以帮助完成本课程。*这项研究将通过建立新的模型来促进现有知识的发展，该模型考虑了营销决策变量、竞争互动和动态效应对供应链的影响。到目前为止，大多数研究都是使用一维和静态模型来研究复杂的供应链问题，这些模型集中在单一决策变量(例如，价格、生产、促销)上，或者忽略了这些变量对企业利润的未来影响。这种模式目光短浅，僵化，而不是有利于供应链长期利益的综合系统。因此，建立新的数学模型是至关重要的，这些模型更准确地表示公司运营的复杂商业环境，以便就如何在市场上有效地竞争和合作产生有用的战略建议。*该计划还将提高对营销决策如何影响供应链关系和运营的理解，这可以显著改善商业实践，从而帮助加拿大的经济发展。这项研究的见解有助于提高供应链公司的业绩和降低成本，从而指导加拿大公司提高其在全球市场的竞争地位。它们还将有助于政府机构评估竞争对市场动态和消费者福利的影响。