在项目复杂团队中，如何促进不同专业主体间的合作是管理者需要解决的关键问题。区别于传统项目管理研究，本课题从行为因素的角度出发，深入分析公平偏好条件下项目复杂团队中的跨专业合作问题，讨论风险偏好、信息结构、项目类型、委托人偏好等因素对代理人合作行为和激励机制的影响，以及代理人公平偏好的演化规律。首先，构建静态合作模型，作为课题的模型基础；接着，将模型扩展为多阶段的动态合作模型，讨论互补和非互补型项目中各阶段的合作行为和最优激励机制；第三，假设代理人是异质的，将行为意图加入公平效用函数中；第四，分析委托人的社会偏好对代理人合作行为和激励机制的影响；最后，构建代理人公平和自私偏好的有限群体间接演化博弈模型，探究外界环境因素如何影响代理人公平偏好的演化。课题研究成果能够为提高项目复杂团队的管理水平和跨专业合作效率提供有力的理论支撑和策略建议。

In a complex project team, one important problem a manager needs to solve is how to promote cooperation among different specialized individuals. Being different from traditional research on project management, this study adopts the approach of behavior economics, and investigates the problem of cooperation cross specialization in a complex project team under the condition of fairness preference. This study discusses influence on agents’ cooperative behavior and incentive mechanism from risk preference, information structure, project types and preference of principle; it also reveals the rules of evolution on agents’ fairness preference. Firstly, it sets up a static model of cooperation as the base of this study. Then, it extends to a dynamic model of multi-stage cooperation, and discusses cooperative behavior and optimal incentive mechanism in each stage of complementary, as well as non-complementary projects. Thirdly, it assumes that agents are heterogeneous and add behavior intention into fairness utility functions. Fourthly, it analyzes the effect of principle’s social preference on agents’ cooperative behavior and incentive mechanism. Lastly, it establishes an indirect evolutionary game model on agents’ fairness and selfish preference in a finite population. The findings of this study can provide solid theory support and policy suggestion on promoting skills of management and efficiency of cooperation cross specialization in a complex project team.