本课题以中国的土地财政为背景，旨在研究地方收入制度影响地方公共品提供行为的理论机制和经验证据。课题试图回答以下问题：公共产品资本化效应在中国存在吗？资本化效应会随着时间推移和供给方的调整而消失吗？资本化效应会对公共产品的供给方产生激励作用吗？资本化效应与不同的地方收入制度相结合，可对地方政府的公共品提供行为产生不同的财政激励。以交易型土地出让收入为主要特征的地方收入制度会对公共品提供产生时空扭曲和人际扭曲（城市户籍人口和非户籍人口之间）。当代中国地方财政的两大特征事实——公共支出结构偏向和城市公共品歧视性提供，虽“病灶”不同，但“病理”相近，均由地方土地收入制度所致。改革地方土地财政收入制度，才能校正地方支出行为扭曲，实现公共品的均衡配置。这对于理解当代中国的财政分权体制运行原理和财政制度设计具有重要价值。

Based on China's land finance, this project aims at examing the relationship between local revenue institution and local public goods provision. It tries to answer the following questions: Does capitalization effect exsit in China? Will the capitalization effect diminish with the adjustments of supply side? Will capitalization effect create incentives for the provision of local public goods ? The combination of capitalization effect and different local revenue institutions will create different fiscal incentives for local government. If local government is financed with land use right transfer revenues, fiscal incentives will be distorted with respect to time , space and people without city Hukou. Both the structural bias of China's public expenditure and the discriminatory public goods provision under the Hukou regulation have roots in land finance. Distortions of local expenditure behavior can be erased by land finance reform. It will be helpful to understand the principles of China's decentralization system and be of great importance for the design of fiscal institutions.