不同供应链结构下合作生产型服务的参与机制与决策优化研究

在咨询、信息安全、网络营销等合作生产型服务的外包过程中，服务的成功取决于服务商与客户企业的共同努力。他们的努力程度可能无法观测或难以验证，从而导致了双边道德风险问题。当一个服务商只服务一家客户企业时，双方可能制定基于服务绩效的收益分享合同。当他服务于多家同质客户时，可采用基于相对绩效的锦标赛合同。此外，在基于服务外包平台（如：猪八戒网等）的环境下，平台商可能采用会员制或佣金制收费，服务商可能基于线上、线下双渠道提供差异化的服务内容和定价。本课题拟考虑单服务商-单客户企业、单服务商-多客户企业、基于服务外包平台的供应链结构，研究服务商与客户企业采用收益分享、锦标赛、固定价格等合同时的参与机制设计问题，以及平台商的最优定价模式，服务商的渠道选择等决策。在此基础上，考虑合同制定时服务商拥有先天的服务能力，客户企业拥有质量偏好信息时，研究信息不对称环境下服务商与客户企业的信号传递与信息甄别策略。

The performance of many coproductive services, such as consulting, information security and on-line marketing, depends on the efforts spent by both the service provider and the client firm. However, their quality efforts may be unobservable and thus non-contractible, which leads to the two-sided moral hazard problem. When the service provider serves only one client firm (one-to-one supply chain), they may agree on a performance-based contract. In case the service provider serves two or more client firms (one-to-two supply chain), the service provider can provide a tournament contract, under which each client firm is compensated based on its relative performance over other client firms. In addition, the service provider may serve the clients through two channels: the off-line brick-and-mortar channel and the on-line channel via a third-party service outsourcing platform, such as www.zbj.com. In such a case, the service provider offers differentiated services for the two channels. This project addresses the contract design and decision optimization problems under the one-to-one, one-to-two, and platform-based supply chain structures. The performance-based, tournament and fixed-fee contracts under different supply chain structures are investigated. The channel selection decision of the service provider and the pricing decision of the outsourcing platform are then analyzed. We also develop the signaling and screening models when the service provider holds private cost information or the client firm holds private quality preference information.