近年来，跨国公司凭借技术优势或产品垄断能力，在中国推行包括转售价格维持（RPM）等在内的纵向控制策略，侵害了中国消费者利益。而当前国内反垄断部门针对跨国公司RPM行为所采取的"一刀切"式规制标准和"一案一议"的裁决程序，很容易受到来自理论界和实业界的种种质疑。本项目拟基于产业纵向关系理论视角，梳理、分析跨国公司在华实施RPM策略性行为的驱动因素；进而尝试构造"跨国公司-本土代理人-消费者"（M-A-C）纵向博弈模型，研究跨国公司如何利用RPM策略实现垄断势力在产业链中传导以及相应的纵向传导机制，并揭示和测度跨国公司RPM策略的激励效应以及反竞争效果。在此基础上，本项目将结合在华跨国公司RPM策略的社会福利效应分析，试图给出针对不同RPM行为的规制方式以及一般性规制路径，为中国反垄断部门的规制政策体系完善提供决策参考和理论支撑。

In recent years, multi-national companies impose vertical restraints including resale price maintenance (RPM) into the downstream firms, depending on their technological superiorities or product monopoly power in China, which harms to Chinese consumers' benefits and influences the social welfare. China's antitrust authorities using one-size-fits-all regulation standard and case-by-case regulation process were easily be suspected by the theoretical cycle and the business circles. The project will summarize the motive factors for which multi-national companies use RPM strategy, in views of the industrial relation; furthermore, the Multi-national companies -Local Agency-Consumers(M-A-C) vertical gaming model will be tried to constructed for studying that how multi-national companies make the monopoly power liquid in industrial chain by RPM, and revealing the mechanism of monopoly power liquidation and the effects of incentive and anti-competition of RPM strategy. Above all, the project will try to give the regulation means for different RPM behaviors and the standard regulation rules, which offers decision references and theory serves for China's antitrust authorities's regulation policy.