Causal essentialism in kinds.
Causal essentialism in kinds.
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DOI：
10.1080/17470218.2012.730533
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发表时间：
2013-06
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Bloom P
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ahn WK;Taylor EG;Kato D;Marsh JK;Bloom P
本研究考察了从概念的心理唯物主义中衍生出来的因果唯物主义。我们研究人们是否相信一个类别的成员共享一些基本的本质，这是必要的和足够的类别成员资格，也导致表面特征。其主要主张是，因果范畴论仅限于与我们对现有种类的直觉概念相对应的范畴，因此对于基于任意标准的范畴来说，因果范畴论的影响更小。实验1和3发现，人们公开认可非任意类型的因果本质，但不太可能对任意类别这样做。实验2和4发现，人们更愿意概括一个成员的已知因果关系（或缺乏）时，处理一种比处理一个任意类别。种类和任意类别之间的这些差异在各个领域都有发现不仅是生物的类别，而且还有人工制品。这些发现具有一定的现实意义，包括人们如何理解被视为真实的精神障碍。
The current study examines Causal Essentialism, derived from Psychological Essentialism of concepts. We examine whether people believe that members of a category share some underlying essence that is both necessary and sufficient for category membership and that also causes surface features. The main claim is that Causal Essentialism is restricted to categories that correspond to our intuitive notions of existing kinds, and hence is more attenuated for categories that are based on arbitrary criteria. Experiments 1 and 3 found that people overtly endorse causal essences in non-arbitrary kinds but are less likely to do so for arbitrary categories. Experiments 2 and 4 found that people were more willing to generalize a member’s known causal relations (or lack thereof) when dealing with a kind than when dealing with an arbitrary category. These differences between kinds and arbitrary categories were found across various domains—not only categories of living things, but also for artifacts. These findings have certain real-world implications, including how people make sense of mental disorders that are treated as real kinds.
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影响因子：
5.4
作者：
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通讯作者：
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