Theoretical Analysis of Economic Rationality

这个有趣的项目研究了 经济分析。 经济学的基本概念 关于消费品和服务购买的理论， 参与劳动力市场和订立合同 是效用最大化。 的 也就是说，人们做出的选择，他们认为会给他们带来 最大的满足，这样做，他们放弃了其他选择。 这 这似乎是老生常谈，但同时又是不言而喻的，而且意义深远。 这一方法使人们对许多重要问题有了深入的了解。 为 比如说，在一定的工资率下，人们会干多少活？ 他们会把收入的多少存起来？ 征税会有什么影响 对汽油的购买或对汽车的数量 英里驱动。 显然，这些是决策者面临的重要问题， 生产者、消费者和其他经济主体。 然而，效用最大化的方法有时并非如此。 很容易适用于观察到的人类行为。 很多时候人们 继续在观察者看来不合理的行为。 研究这类行为的经济学家和心理学家经常解释这一点 由于人类无法有效地处理 海量的信息提供给他们。 因此，它们隐含地衍生出 经验法则，或其他快捷方式，允许合理快速 决策，但可能不会导致真正给出的选择 从长远来看，最大的满意度。 经济行为人进入 长期合同，即使在短期内， 每个代理人独立行动可能会做得更好。 的 也就是说，合同的每一方都可能有欺骗的动机， 特别是如果作弊无法被检测到。 这个非常创新的 项目探讨了在合同上作弊的动机， 签订合同的个人所传达的信息，以及 可能会减少作弊动机的机制。 弗兰克教授使用博弈论的框架来分析，所以- 被称为“囚徒困境”的问题。 在 通过这种方式，他获得了大量的信息， 人类行为的处理机制，并最终转化为 经济主体以理性方式行事的能力。

This interesting project examines the basic behavioral foundations of economic analysis. The fundamental concept underpinning economic theory regarding the purchase of consumer goods and services, participation in the labor market, and the establishment of contracts between people or institutions is the maximization of utility. That is to say, people make choices which they perceive will bring them the most satisfaction, and in doing so they forgo other choices. This seeming truism is both self-evident and profound at the same time. The approach has provided insights into many important questions. For instance, faced with a given wage rate, how much will people work? What fraction of their incomes will they save? What effect will a tax on gasoline have on the purchase of automobiles or on the number of miles driven. Clearly these are important questions to policy makers, producers, consumers, and other economic agents. The approach of utility maximization is, however, sometimes not readily applicable to observed human behavior. Many times people continue in behavior which to an observer appears irrational. Economists and psychologists who study such behavior often explain it as the result of human beings' inability to process effectively the ocean of information available to them. Thus they implicitly derive rules of thumb, or other shortcuts which allow for reasonably rapid decision making, but might not result in the choice which truly gives the most satisfaction over the long run. Economic agents enter into long term contracts with each other, even though in the short term each agent might be able to do better by acting independently. That is to say, each party to a contract might have the incentive to cheat, particularly if the cheating cannot be detected. This very innovative project explores the incentives to cheat on contracts, the types of information conveyed by individuals entering into contracts, and mechanisms which might diminish the incentive to cheat. Professor Frank uses a game theoretic framework to analyze the so- called prisoner's dilemma in a variety of interesting settings. In this manner he gains a great deal of insight into the information processing mechanisms of human behavior, and ultimately into the ability of economic agents to act in a rational manner.