Dominant Strategy Theory and (NON-) Homogeneous Economies

这个项目的贡献来自于开发了一种新的方法来解决经济理论的核心问题，即市场失灵的决定因素。经济学家已经编制了一个市场效率例外的分类。例如，如果生产回报增加或公共产品被买卖，市场的最优性定理就不成立。本项目利用机制理论和具有连续主体的经济模型的发展，对市场失灵进行更普遍、更有力的剖析。这项研究建立在调查人员过去工作的基础上。他们有能力做这项工作。机制研究是一种有吸引力的方法，因为它具有通用性。市场是许多不同类型的资源配置机制之一，因此市场可能无法实现经济效率，而其他一些机制可能不会失败。研究者在他们之前的工作中已经表明，机制失效的根源是由于收益增加、外部性和公共产品而导致的垄断权力的存在。在这个项目中，他们描述了适用于可转让或不可转让效用和有限代理或非原子模型的有效优势策略机制。对于这种机制的存在或可行性，环境的同质性被证明是机制失效的决定性条件。在机制失灵和市场失灵之间建立了联系。对贝叶斯纳什均衡和优势策略均衡进行了比较。本文研究了双重拍卖模型这一特例的优势策略属性，并将研究结果应用于具有少量代理的市场中实现均衡的问题。从理论上研究了双拍卖市场的渐近性质。在非原子模型中，同质性与非同质性的问题是通过特别参考瓦尔拉斯均衡的存在、非完全竞争瓦尔拉斯均衡的特征和垄断竞争现象来解决的。

The contribution of this project comes from developing a new approach to an issue central to economic theory, i.e., the determinants of market failure. Economists have compiled a taxonomy of exceptions to market efficiency. For example, optimality theorems for markets do not hold if the returns to production are increasing or if public goods are bought or sold. This project uses developments in mechanism theory and models of economies with a continuum of agents to develop a more general and more powerful anatomy of market failure. This research builds on past work by the investigators. They are capable of doing the work. The study of mechanisms is an attractive approach because of its generality. Markets are one of many different types of mechanisms for allocating resources, so markets may fail to achieve economic efficiency where some other mechanisms might not fail. The investigators have shown in their previous work that the source of mechanism failure is the presence of monopoly power due to increasing returns, externalities and public goods. In this project they characterize efficient dominant strategy mechanisms applicable to transferable or non-transferable utility and finite agent or nonatomic models. For the existence, or feasibility, of such mechanisms, homogenity of the environment is shown to be the decisive condition without which there is mechanism failure. Connections are drawn between mechanism failure and market failure. Comparisons are made between Bayesian Nash equilibrium and dominant strategy equilibrium. A special case, the double-auction model, is examined for dominant strategy properties and the findings are applied to the question of attainment of equilibrium in a market with a small number of agents. Theoretically, asymptotic properties of double-auction markets are investigated. The issue of homogeneity versus non-homogeneity in nonatomic models is addressed with special reference to the existence of Walrasian equilibrium, the characterization of Walrasian equilibria that are not perfectly competitive, and the phenomenon of monopolistic competition.