Realism and Scientific Instrumentation

在科学哲学中，关于实在论和工具论的争论由来已久，至今仍未得到解决。各种各样的现实主义者都想争辩说，科学理论要么是正确的，要么越来越接近世界运行的真相。例如，现实主义者会认为夸克确实存在。工具主义者（反现实主义者）认为不可能知道我们的理论是否正确。相反，他们认为，在我们的科学研究中，唯一有效的一点是看看这些理论是否有效，也就是说，它们是否做出了正确的预测。他们会争辩说，不可能知道夸克是否存在，但它们确实是预测某些实验中会发生什么的一个很好的“工具”。在这笔资助下，布朗博士正在寻求发展和捍卫一种他称之为“弱现实主义”的新版本的科学现实主义。弱实在论可以概括为两个论点：(1)科学的目标之一是发展能够真实描述世界特征的理论；由于科学仪器的日益多样化和复杂化，我们追求这一目标的能力一直在增强。弱实在论与那些否认追求真理是合法的科学目标的反实在论观点形成对比。弱现实主义也与其他现存版本的科学现实主义形成对比，因为弱现实主义不要求任何当前的科学理论是正确的或近似正确的，也不要求这些理论中假设的实体存在。尽管如此，被布朗博士称为“弱现实主义”的观点是一种比目前正在争论的其他现实主义更强的现实主义形式。与早期的努力相比，这种方法特别重要的是强调在通往现实主义的论证路线中日益复杂的工具的作用。布朗博士将以一种科学哲学家从未做过的方式仔细研究这种高度复杂的仪器在当代科学理论发展中的作用。

There has been a long and as yet unresolved debate between realism and instrumentalism in the philosophy of science. Realists of various stripes want to argue that the theories of science are either true or are becoming closer and closer approximations to the truth about how the world works. Realists, for example, would argue that quarks really exist. Instrumentalists (anti-realists) argue that it is impossible to know whether our theories are true. Rather, they argue, the only valid point in our study of science is to see if the theories work, i.e. whether they make correct predictions. They would argue that it is impossible to know whether quarks exist, but they do serve as a good "instrument" for predicting what will happen in certain experiments. Under this grant, Dr. Brown is seeking to develop and defend a new version of scientific realism that he calls "weak realism." Weak realism can be summarized in two theses: (1) One aim of science is the development of theories that provide true descriptions of features of the world; (2) Because of the growing variety and sophistication of scientific instrumentation, our ability to pursue this goal has been increasing. Weak realism stands in contrast to those antirealist views which deny that the pursuit of truth is a legitimate scientific aim. Weak realism also stands in contrast to other extant versions of scientific realism since weak realism does not require that any current scientific theories be true or approximately true, or that the entities postulated in these theories exist. Still, the view that Dr. Brown calls "weak realism" is a considerably stronger form of realism than others currently under debate. What is especially important about this approach, in contrast to earlier efforts, is the emphasis on the role of increasingly sophisticated instrumentation in the argumentative route to realism. Dr. Brown will carefully examine in a way that philosophers of science have not previous done the role of this highly complex instrumentation in the development of contemporary scientific theories.