The Dynamics of Conceptual Change

观念变革是科学理论所有重大变革的重要组成部分。哲学家和科学史学家试图刻画概念变化的特征，导致了两个主要观点：概念变化是连续和累积的，概念变化是不连续和突然的。然而，内尔塞西安博士发现，对不同理论之间过渡期的精细结构分析显示，这两种描述都不够充分。观念上的变化是持续的，但不是简单的累积。要对历史数据进行解释性说明，就需要对概念结构如何变化的动态进行调查。在这笔拨款的支持下，内尔塞西恩博士将根据启发式推理、概念化和归类以及概念变化的认知理论来研究科学中实际的概念变化。这些理论与三个主要概念变化之间的契合度将被调查。作为她的项目的个案研究，她将考察的历史转变是从中世纪到牛顿运动理论，随后从牛顿运动理论到狭义和广义相对论，以及从牛顿力学到量子力学。她的分析应该会加深我们对概念结构如何出现以及如何被科学界采用的理解，也应该会开辟认知科学研究的新领域。

Conceptual change has been a significant component of all major changes of theory in science. Attempts by philosophers and historians of science to characterize conceptual change have led to two main views: conceptual change is continuous and cumulative and conceptual change is discontinuous and abrupt. Dr. Nersessian has found, however, that fine-structure analyses of transition periods between theories show both characterizations to be inadequate. Conceptual change is continuous but not simply cumulative. Providing an explanatory account for the historical data requires an investigation into the dynamics of how conceptual structures change. With the support of this grant, Dr. Nersessian will examine actual conceptual changes in science in light of cognitive theories of heuristic reasoning, conceptualization and categorization, and conceptual change. The extent of fit between these theories and three major conceptual changes will be investigated. The historical transitions she will be examining as case studies for her project are the move from medieval to Newtonian theories of motion, the subsequent move from Newtonian theories of motion to the special and general theories of relativity, and the move from Newtonian mechanics to quantum mechanics. Her analysis should deepen our understanding of how conceptual structures emerge and are adopted by scientific communities, and should also open up new areas of investigation in the cognitive sciences.