Imperfect Competition and Macroeconomic Fluctuations

近年来，不完全竞争的宏观经济后果引起了越来越多的研究兴趣。首席研究员开发了不完全竞争产品市场的模型，这些模型为具有低效但可分级的均衡结果的经济体提供了重要的见解。他关注的协调问题在于，单个非合作行为的代理人如何从较差的均衡位置转移到更好的均衡位置。如果优化个体代理人缺乏协调其行动以达到首选均衡的能力，那么一个经济体可能会陷入相对于一系列均衡的糟糕结果。出现的一个关键问题是，政府在获得或促进必要的协调方面可能发挥什么作用。拟议研究的一个重点是这些经济体通过企业的进入和退出以及库存持有量所产生的跨期联系的动态行为。其次，计划分析战略互补性在同步企业离散决策中的作用。由于跨部门的需求流动，不完全竞争经济体的多部门模型中出现了战略互补性。作为这些互补性的结果，这些模型中的冲击也会跨时间和跨部门传播。本研究的第三个主要研究重点是泛化形式游戏。对这些问题的研究是为了更好地理解协调问题的博弈论基础，并阐明在具有多个(帕累托)排序的均衡的经济环境中的均衡选择过程。

The macroeconomic consequences of imperfect competition have attracted increasing research interest in recent years. Models of imperfectly competitive product markets have been developed by the principal investigator which provide important insights into economies with inefficient but rankable equilibrium outcomes. The coordination problem, on which he focuses, consists in how individual agents acting non-cooperatively may move from an inferior equilibrium position to a better one. If optimizing individual agents lack the capability to coordinate their actions to reach a preferred equilibrium, then an economy can become stuck at bad outcomes relative to the set of equilibria. A key question that arises is what role the government might play in obtaining or facilitating the necessary coordination. One emphasis of the proposed research is on the dynamic behavior of these economies through both entry and exit of firms and the intertemporal linkage created by inventory holdings. Second, it is planned to analyze the role of strategic complementarities in synchronizing discrete decisions of firms. Strategic complementarity appears in multi-sector models of imperfectly competitive economies due to the demand flows across sectors. As a consequence of these complementarities, shocks in these models also are propagated across time and over sectors. The third main research emphasis of the research is on extensive form games. These are studied to gain a better understanding of the game theoretic foundation of coordination problems and to shed light on the equilibrium selection process in economic settings with multiple, (Pareto-)ranked, equilibria.