Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science

法国最近在“同居”和少数群体方面的经验 政府表明，议会程序的规则 议会行动者的行为，因此发挥了核心作用， 决定政策结果的作用。 这些经验也表明， 选举结果决定了议会行为体的机会， 利用议会规则。 因此，如果我们要了解 法国议会机构促进或抑制 法国公民的政治代表，我们必须 清楚地了解法国的议会机构是如何形成 议会演员的行为。 本博士论文研究项目从理论上进行了研究， 经验上的议会决策规则，政治影响， 以及法国国民议会的立法成果。 研究 试图描述和解释选举结果如何形成 议会行为体利用议会规则的机会 以影响最终政策的方式。 该研究的重点是使用 四个行为体：总统、政府、 (i.e.,总理和内阁）、委员会和私人 成员在地板上。 作为一个理论框架，该研究依赖于 在立法选择的形式化演绎模型上。 研究计划包括在巴黎完成的两项任务， 法国 第一，程序规则与 将通过构建一个数据集来评估立法成果， 对提交给政府的法案所涉及的各种程序进行了编码， 国民议会在过去12年的四个不同时期， 年 将被编码的项目包括推迟的动议， 谴责、阻挠投票、提交宪法理事会， 委员会的把关， 政府，修正案的非相关性声明，总统 法令的“否决权”，参议院的会议委员会， 政府地位。 第二，将与 议会的常任秘书长， 委员会和来自几个政党的代表，以了解如何 这些参与者感知决策规则之间的关系， 利益期间的立法影响。 这项研究将大大有助于我们了解如何 法国议会机构和选举结果塑造 议会行动者影响政策的机会。 研究 还将阐明建模所必须的假设 议会制度所特有的立法机构， 使立法选择的更一般的理论成为可能， 民主制度。

Recent experiences in France with "cohabitation" and minority Government demonstrate that the rules of parliamentary procedure shape the behavior of parliamentary actors and consequently play a central role in determining policy outcomes. These experiences also show that electoral outcomes determine opportunities for parliamentary actors to utilize parliamentary rules. Hence, if we are to understand how French parilamentary institutions promote - - or inhibit - - the political representation of French citizens, it is essential that we clearly understand how parliamentary institutions in France shape behavior by parliamentary actors. This doctoral dissertation research project examines theoretically and empirically parliamentary decision making rules, political influence, and legislative outcomes in the French National Assembly. The research attempts to describe and explain how election outcomes shape opportunities for parliamentary actors to utilize parliamentary rules in ways that influence final policy. The study focuses on the use of parliamentary procedures by four actors: the President, the Government (i.e., the prime minister and cabinet), committees, and private members on the floor. As a theoretical framework, the study relies heavily on formal, deductive models of legislative choice. The plan of research includes two tasks to be accomplished in Paris, France. First, the relationship between procedural rules and legislative outcomes will be assessed by constructing a data set that codes various procedures invoked in connection with bills submitted to the National Assembly during four different periods in the last twelve years. Items that will be coded include motions to delay, motions to censure, blocked votes, referrals to the Constitutional Council, gatekeeping by committees, gatekeeping through agenda control by the Government, declarations of non-germaneness of amendments, presidential "vetoes" of decrees, conference committees with the Senate, and the Government status. Second, interviews will be conducted with the Assembly's parliamentarian, the permanent secretaries of several committees, and deputies from several parties in order to learn how these actors perceive the relationship between decision rules and legislative influence during the periods of interest. This study will contribute significantly to our understanding of how French parliamentary institutions and election outcomes shape opportunities for parliamentary actors to influence policy. The study will also illuminate the assumptions that must be made to model legislative institutions that are unique to parliamentary systems, making possible a more general theory of legislative choice in democratic systems.