Dynamic Problems in Oligopoly Theory and Tax Theory

这个项目在公共场合考察各种动态问题 金融、宏观经济和产业组织。 在税收理论中 该项目确定了最优税收的特点， 资本和劳动收入，使用非线性数值技术，以及 合理限制政府行为。 它 如果政府不能， 预先承诺最优策略。 在产业组织中， 一个项目研究了寡头垄断的动态模型，允许公司 选择数量和价格，基本上合并了 Bertrand和Cournot模型。 用动态模型来检验 投资、学习、信号和 合并的动机。 该项目还开发了数字 技术是必要的检查这些动态问题 需求和供应的一般规格。 税收政策研究尤为及时和重要。 调查人员过去的工作表明， 结果之间的实质性差异， 标准的税务分析和结果， 随机模型 该项目确立了 通过开发更现实的模型来获得理论结果。损失 由于非最优规则是通过比较最优的 具有替代方案的政策。

This project examines a variety of dynamic problems in public finance, macroeconomics and industrial organization. In tax theory the project determines the characteristics of optimal taxation of capital and labor income, using nonlinear numerical techniques, and incorporating reasonable restrictions on government behavior. It also computes the political outcomes if governments cannot precommit to optimal policies. In industrial organization the project examines a dynamic model of oligopoly which allows firms to choose both quantities and prices, essentially merging the Bertrand and Cournot models. The dynamic model is used to examine the strategic importance of investment, learning, signalling and the incentives for merger. The project also develops numerical techniques which are necessary to examines these dynamic problems with general specifications of demand and supply. The research on tax policy is especially timely and important. The investigator's past work demonstrated that there are substantial differences between the results obtained from standard tax analysis and results from truly dynamic and stochastic models. This project establishes the robustness of the theoretical results by developing more realistic models. The loss due to nonoptimal rules is determined by comparing the optimal policy with alternatives.