Informational Imperfections and Economic Behavior

这个项目试图扩大我们对不完全信息环境中的社会和经济行为的理解。该项目由两个主要部分组成。该项目的第一部分研究集群，而第二部分研究不完全收缩。“集群”指的是人们的行为相似，尽管他们的喜好不同。例子包括羊群行为(例如，形成文化或亚文化行为标准)、在继承人之间平均分配遗产的普遍做法，以及“我也是”政治候选人的激增。这个项目探索了基于两个关键假设的集群理论：决策者渴望受欢迎或尊重，行为是可观察到的，但真实特征是不可观察的。在一类数学模型中，这些假设会产生选择的聚集，即使真正的特征没有聚集在一起。研究的这一部分将导致对不同市场的消费行为做出新的预测。“不完全合同”指的是合同往往不能涵盖许多或有事项。本项目基于两个假设探索不完全合同理论：执行合同的人(例如，法院或仲裁员)不能观察到某些行为，以及合同各方未来将再次互动。在一类数学模型中，这些假设意味着，显性合同的当事人可能会保留一些含糊不清的条款，以便改进其协议的隐含方面。研究的这一部分将提供关于为什么合同省略了某些或有事项的见解，即使将它们包括在内似乎并不是很昂贵。

This project attempts to expand our understanding of social and economic behavior in environments with imperfect information. The project consists of two main parts. The first part of the project examines clustering, while the second studies incomplete contracting. "Clustering" refers to situations in which people act similarly, even though their preferences are different. Examples include herd behavior (for example, the formation of cultural or sub-cultural standards of behavior), the common practice of dividing estates equally among heirs, and the proliferation of "me too" political candidates. This project explores a theory of clustering based on two key assumptions: decision-makers desire popularity or esteem, and actions are observable but true characteristics are not. In a class of mathematical models, these assumptions produce clustering of choices, even when true characteristics are not clustered. This part of the study will lead to novel predictions about consumption behavior in various markets. "Incomplete contracting" refers to the fact that contracts often fail to cover many contingencies. This project explores a theory of incomplete contracts based on two assumptions: certain actions are not observable by those who enforce contracts (for example, courts or arbitrators), and parties to a contract will interact again in the future. In a class of mathematical models, these assumptions imply that parties to an explicit contract may leave some provisions ambiguous in order to improve the implicit aspects of their agreement. This part of the study will provide insights concerning why contracts leave out certain contingencies even when including them does not seem very costly.