Sequential Fundraising

摘要众所周知，慈善机构经常选择在筹款活动中宣布过去的捐款。然而，这种类型的公告策略似乎是不一致的标准预测，顺序移动游戏的结果比同步移动游戏的贡献水平较小。本提案中概述的项目将开发一种理论，解释筹款游戏中公告策略的使用。此外，将进行两个实验，以测试在连续的公共利益游戏的贡献的理论预测。该项目不仅将提高对筹款游戏的顺序性质的理解，而且还将提高我们对慈善捐赠的整体理解。该研究的结果将被记录在六篇可发表的论文中--四篇理论论文和两篇实验论文。在第一篇论文中，开发了一个简单的模型，其中捐助者是相同的，慈善机构的质量可以通过获取昂贵的信息来揭示。结果表明，高质量慈善机构的筹款人更喜欢宣布过去的捐款。原因是第一个捐款人根据公告购买信息，并通过他的第一次捐款揭示慈善机构的质量。第二篇论文放松了贡献者是相同的假设，以证明贡献者的异质性意味着一个最优的募捐顺序，这种顺序使得筹款人不可能欺骗和征求多个贡献者的第一次捐款。在前两篇论文中，购买信号是完美的，筹款人没有动机做出多个公告。筹款人连续发布公告的一个原因可能是信号是嘈杂的。第三篇论文探讨了这种模式。为了保持分析的简单性，我们忽略了购买选项的信息，而是假设所有的贡献者都接收到了私密的噪声信号。在这个模型中，捐助者使用过去的捐款信息来更新他们对慈善机构质量的信念，并且很可能出现信息级联。两个不同的实验测试了纯利他主义理论对连续公共利益游戏中捐款的预测。第一个实验通过检查三个公共利益游戏中的贡献来测试顺序移动贡献游戏的预测：同时游戏，顺序游戏和最后一个顺序游戏，其中第一个贡献者不能承诺一次性贡献。第二个实验考察了公共产品的生产技术对连续公共产品游戏中贡献的影响。除了检验传统的自愿捐款预测外，这两项试验还对最近的公平模式进行了实证检验。这些公平模型的一个有趣的特点是，他们预测更高的贡献水平在顺序公益游戏比同步移动游戏，这表明公平的偏好可能是第三个解释使用公告策略在筹款游戏。

SBR-9975288VesterlundAbstractIt has been well established that charities often choose to announce past contributions during fundraising drives. However, this type of announcement strategy appears to be inconsistent with the standard prediction that sequential move games result in smaller contribution levels than simultaneous move games. The project outlined in this proposal will develop a theory that explains the use of announcement strategies in fundraising games. In addition, two experiments will be conducted to test the theoretical predictions for contributions in sequential public good games. The proposed project will not only improve understanding of the sequential nature of fundraising games but also our overall understanding of charitable giving.The results of the proposed research will be documented in six publishable papers--four theoretical papers and two experimental papers. In the first paper, a simple model is developed in which contributors are identical and the quality of the charity can be revealed by acquiring costly information. Results indicate that fundraisers for high quality charities prefer to announce past contributions. The reason is that the first contributor, contingent on the announcement, purchases information and reveals the quality of the charity through his first contribution. The second paper l relaxes the assumption that contributors are identical to demonstrate that heterogeneity of contributors implies an optimal solicitation ordering, and this ordering makes it impossible for the fundraiser to cheat and solicit first contributions from multiple contributors.In the first two papers the purchased signal is perfect and the fundraiser has no incentive to make more than one announcement. One reason why fundraisers make continuous announcements may be that the signal is noisy. Such a model is explored in the third paper. To keep the analysis simple, information on the purchasing option is ignored and instead, it is assumed that all contributors receive private and noisy signals. In this model contributors use information about past contributions to update their beliefs about the charity's quality, and an informational cascade is likely to arise.Two different experiments test the predictions of the purely altruistic theory for contributions in sequential public good games. The first experiment tests the predictions of sequential move contribution games by examining the contributions in three public good games: a simultaneous game, a sequential game and finally a sequential game where the first contributor cannot commit to a one-time contribution. The second experiment examines the effect of the public good's production technology on contributions in sequential public good games. In addition to testing the traditional voluntary contribution predictions these two experiments also provide empirical tests of recent models of fairness. An interesting feature of these fairness models is that they predict higher contribution levels in sequential public good games than in simultaneous move games, suggesting that preferences for fairness may be a third explanation for the use of announcement strategies in fundraising games.