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Testing a Symbolic Interactionist Theory of Deterrence, Informal Social Control, and Delinquency

Testing a Symbolic Interactionist Theory of Deterrence, Informal Social Control, and Delinquency
检验威慑、非正式社会控制和犯罪的象征性互动理论
批准号:
0004323
负责人:
Ross Matsueda
金额:
$9.63万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2001
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2001-08-15 至 2005-06-30

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
这个项目发展了一个关于角色扮演、威慑和犯罪的象征性互动理论。这一观点被用来整合最近的威慑研究——逮捕和监禁等惩罚威胁阻止个人犯罪的能力——以及非正式社会控制研究——家庭、学校和社区等机构通过非正式控制预防犯罪的能力。根据犯罪的符号互动理论,有组织的群体通过角色扮演来控制成员的行为。当正在进行的活动受阻或中断时,个体就会进行认知行为,在这种行为中,他们会考虑他人对行动路线的预期反应,最重要的是,他们会从他人的角度看待自己。更具体地说,这个项目将解决以下问题。首先,个人是否根据贝叶斯学习模型来学习犯罪的感知成本和回报?在贝叶斯学习模型中,对成本和回报的先验信念影响行为,但随后根据该行为的后果进行修改。其次,违约决策是否遵循有限理性模型,即行为者满足而非优化?决策的符号互动主义模型是否能说明拖欠决策倾向于理性的条件?第三,是否存在威慑效应出现的特定条件,符号互动主义学习模型能否识别这些条件?第四,通过研究未来自我报告的犯罪行为和当前的犯罪意图,我们能否调和文献中不同的发现?该项目将使用两个数据集。全国青年调查和丹佛青年研究。该项目将对我们理解犯罪决策,以及非正式社会控制和正式制裁如何影响犯罪行为做出重要贡献。此外,该研究将对理性决策的基础研究和旨在通过加强制度而不是投资于警察、法院和监狱来减少犯罪的公共政策产生影响。
英文摘要
This project develops a symbolic interactionist theory of role-taking, deterrence, and delinquency. This perspective is used to integrate recent research on deterrence -- the ability of threats of punishment such as arrest and incarceration to deter individuals from crime -- and research on informal social control -- the ability of institutions, such as families, schools, and communities to prevent crime through informal controls. According to the symbolic interactionist theory of delinquency, organized groups control the behavior of members through role-taking. When ongoing lines of activity are blocked or interrupted, individuals engage in cognitive behavior, in which they consider the anticipated reactions of other to lines of action and most importantly views of self from the standpoint of others. This project, more specifically, will address the following issues. First, do individuals learn perceived costs and returns to crime based on a Bayesian learning model, in which prior beliefs about costs and returns influence behavior, but are then modified based on the consequences of that behavior? Second, do delinquent decisions follow a model of limited rationality, in which actors satisfice, rather than optimize? And can a symbolic interactionist model of decision-making specify the conditions under which delinquent decisions tend toward rationality? Third, are there specific conditions under which deterrent effects appear, and can a symbolic interactionist learning model identify those conditions? Fourth, by examining both future self-reported delinquency and present delinquent intentions, can we reconcile divergent findings in the literature? The project will employ two data sets. The National Youth Survey and the Denver Youth Study. The project will make important contributions to our understanding of delinquent decision-making, and the way in which informal social control and formal sanctioning operate to affect delinquent behavior. Moreover, the research will have implications for basic research on rational decision-making, and public policies intended to reduce crime by strengthening institutions versus investing in police, courts, and prisons.
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Collective Efficacy and Norm Violation: An Experimental Test
  • 批准号:
    1625273
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $23.15万
  • 财政年份:
    2016
  • 负责人:
    Ross Matsueda
  • 依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research: Parenting, Family Communication, and Children's Behavior
  • 批准号:
    1436259
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $0.36万
  • 财政年份:
    2015
  • 负责人:
    Ross Matsueda
  • 依托单位:
Differential Neighborhood Organization: A Multi-Level Theory of Crime
  • 批准号:
    0966662
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $18.25万
  • 财政年份:
    2010
  • 负责人:
    Ross Matsueda
  • 依托单位:
Racial Heterogeneity, Neighborhood Controls, and Violence
  • 批准号:
    0004324
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $30.3万
  • 财政年份:
    2001
  • 负责人:
    Ross Matsueda
  • 依托单位:
海外基金