Collaborative Research: The Art of Conversation

随着信息技术的日益普及，决策者，如首席执行官和立法者，越来越有可能从各种专家那里获得建议。进入专业领域。传统观点认为，这样做的结果是，决策者会做出更好的决策。然而，这忽略了一个事实，即专家可能会隐瞒或歪曲信息，以期影响对他们有利的决定。因此，决策者需要考虑沟通的结构——对话——如何影响从专家那里得到的建议的信息量。这个项目研究的是交流的结构是如何形成的。影响决策的质量。项目的第一部分涉及不知情的决策者和知情的专家之间的对话。当专家发出一份书面报告而没有任何对话时，这将导致大量信息丢失。然而，决策者和专家之间的面对面会议可以提高专家建议的信息量——即使决策者完全不知情。决策者和专家都能从对话中获益。这让我们审视以下问题：在面对面的会议中可以可靠地传递多少信息？有可能诱使专家完全透露他的信息吗？在许多情况下，决策者自己可能对决策的某些方面有所了解。例如，一个企业家可能对他的产品的增长前景有详细的了解，但仍然需要金融专业知识来让他的公司上市。项目的第二部分涉及在这种情况下的沟通——决策者和专家都有一些相关的信息。再一次，沟通的结构会严重影响信息交换的数量。例如，在很多情况下，即使决策者被告知，来回的沟通也不会带来信息的获取，我们也会识别这些情况。这让我们不禁要问以下问题：增加更多的沟通，情况是否有所改善？面对面的交流是否优于诸如电子邮件之类的来回交流？第三部分涉及决策是多方面的，信息分散在许多“专家”专家之间的情况。例如，一项立法可能同时影响就业和环境。不同的游说团体可能在这些领域都拥有专业知识。我们研究为专家提供相互交流的机会是否能提高他们建议的信息量。如果决策者也参与进来，情况会有所改善吗？如果专家的专业知识有重叠，情况是否会有所改善？

As information technology has become more widespread, it is now increasinglypossible for decision makers, such as CEOs and legislators, to obtain advice froma variety of experts with di!ering areas of expertise. Conventional wisdom suggeststhat, as a result, the decision maker will reach better decisions. This, however, ignoresthe fact that experts may withhold or distort information in the hope of influencingthe decision in a direction favorable to them. Thus, a decision maker needs to considerhow the structure of communication -- the conversation --affects how informative isthe advice received from experts. This project investigates how the structure ofcommunication a!ects the quality of decisions.The first part of the project concerns conversations between an uninformed deci-sion maker and an informed expert. When the expert sends a written report, unac-companied by any dialogue, this results in substantial information loss. A face-to-facemeeting between a decision maker and an expert, however, leads to an improvementin the informativeness of expert advice--even though the decision maker is completelyuninformed. Both the decision maker and the expert benefit from the conversation.This leads us to examine the following questions: How much information can be cred-ibly transmitted in a face-to-face meeting? Is it possible to induce the expert to fullydisclose his information?In many situations, the decision maker himself may be knowledgeable about someaspects of the decision. As an example, an entrepreneur may have detailed knowl-edge about the growth prospects of his product, but still require financial expertise intaking his company public. The second part of the project concerns communicationin such situations--where both the decision maker and the expert have some rele-vant information. Once again, the structure of communication can critically affectthe amount of information exchanged. For instance, there are many circumstanceswhere back-and-forth communication does not lead to information gains--even if thedecision maker is informed--and we identify these circumstances. This leads us toask the following questions: Is the situation improved by adding more rounds of com-munication? Is a face-to-face meeting superior to a back-and-forth exchange, such asvia E-mail?The third part concerns situations where decisions are multi-faceted and informa-tion is dispersed among many "specialist" experts. For instance, a piece of legislationmay impact both employment and the environment. Different lobbying groups arelikely to possess expertise in each of these areas. We study whether providing expertswith an opportunity to communicate with one another improves the informativenessof their advice. Is the situation improved if the decision maker also participates? Isthe situation improved if there is overlap in the experts' specialized knowledge?