Survivable Trust for Critical Infrastructure

本研究将探讨围绕安全协处理器构建的对等网络的设计。这个名为马里亚纳的网络将被设计成在互联网基础设施遭受网络攻击时具有一定程度的弹性。安全协同处理和点对点技术的结合将创建一个分布式的、可生存的、可信的骨干网络，为迄今为止不存在的关键基础设施提供功能。对于许多应用程序来说，Marianas节点必须是高度可信的。安全协处理器的内核必须确保应用程序不会相互干扰。马里亚纳必须在路由基础设施遭受网络攻击时保持连接。将为不同的用户、应用程序和信任需求开发身份验证基础设施。这些问题的解决方案将利用安全执行、PKI、安全系统和网络系统评估等技术。为了证明这些概念，将开发对候选解决方案进行编码的中间件，并将其安装在小规模的Marianas系统上。更大的马里亚纳系统可以支持关键的基础设施系统，将进行模拟，以评估其性能和面对网络攻击的弹性。

This research will investigate the design of a peer-to-peer network built around secure coprocessors. The network, named Marianas, will be designed to have a level of resiliency in the event of cyberattack on the Internet infrastructure. The combination of secure coprocessing and peer-to-peer technologies will create a distributed survivable trustworthy backbone which enables functionality for critical infrastructure that hitherto did not exist. A Marianas node must be highly trustworthy for many applications. The secure coprocessor's kernel must ensure that applications do not interfere with each other. Marianas must remain connected during a network cyberattack on the routing infrastructure. Authentication infrastructure for diverse user, application, and trust requirements will be developed.The solutions to these problems will draw on technologies for secure execution, PKI, secure systems, and networking systems evaluation. To prove these concepts, middle-ware will be developed that encodes the candidate solutions and will be installed on a small scale Marianas system. Much larger Marianas systems, which could support critical infrastructure systems, will be simulated to evaluate their performance, and resiliency in the face of network attack.