CAREER: Mechanism Design for Resource-Bounded Agents: Indirect Revelation and Strategic Approximations

跨开放网络的分布式计算系统具有许多经济特征，单个计算设备在很大程度上是自主的，代表包括个人和企业在内的多个用户的自身利益。一个根本的挑战是设计有用的机制来解决这些开放系统中的分布式问题，而不考虑单个代理的自身利益。这项工作为使用计算受限代理进行计算机制设计中出现的问题进行了基础性研究。一个组成部分提出了对间接揭示机制的研究，在这种机制中，代理人能够在不计算或透露有关他们的偏好或局部约束的完整信息的情况下参与其中。另一个组成部分建议研究提供与博弈论期望数据近似的机制，如策略证明。在这两种情况下，研究议程都呼吁新的理论和新的计算方法，在系统内建设性地利用理论。这项工作的更广泛影响有望继续将博弈论和经济学方法整合到计算系统中，应用范围从电子市场的自动调解到开放系统中设备之间的自动谈判。其中一个重要组成部分是开发创新的研究生和本科生课程，帮助学生了解计算机科学与经济学之间的接口问题。

Systems with distributed computation across open networks share many characteristics with economies, with individual computational devices that are largely autonomous and represent the self-interest of multiple users, including both individuals and businesses. A fundamental challenge is to design useful mechanisms to solve distributed problems in these open systems despite the self-interest of individual agents. This work proposes a foundational study into the issues that arise in computational mechanism design with computationally-bounded agents. One component proposes the study of indirect revelation mechanisms, in which agents are able to participate without computing, or revealing, complete information about their preferences or local constraints. Another component proposes the study of mechanisms that provide approximations to game-theoretic desiderata, such as strategy proofness. In both cases, the research agenda calls both for new theories and for new computational methods, that leverage the theory constructively within systems. The broader impact of the work promises the continued integration of game-theoretic and economic methods into computational systems, with applications ranging from automated mediation in e-marketplaces, to automated negotiation between devices in open systems. An important component involves the development of innovative graduate and undergraduate curricula, to help to educate students about problems at the interface between computer science and economics.