CAREER: Mechanism Design

职业：机构设计

• 批准号: 0846113
• 负责人: Jason Hartline
• 金额: $ 40万
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-01-01 至 2014-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0846113&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CAREER; Mechanism; Design

Internet systems perform suboptimally because of selfish user behavior; examples include email spam, freeloading, link spam, and packet flooding. How should a multi-user system such as a computer network be designed such that it operates well in the presence of selfish user behavior? The field of mechanism design lays the economic foundations for the design and analysis of protocols, services, and applications in computer networks where users may act selfishly in their own best interest. With varying degrees of clarity, the classical mechanism design literature gives rigorous mathematical tools from which optimal mechanisms can be derived. Unfortunately, except for a few cases, optimal mechanisms are complex, highly dependent on the details of the setting, and impractical. Dr. Hartline addresses each these critiques in detail, and his project includes a well connected research agenda for developing a theory of mechanism design that is relevant to computer systems.This project will develop a theory for the design of mechanisms that are universal, simple, and practical. Mechanisms for computer systems must be universal -- indeed the success of the Internet is owed in part to the fact that most Internet protocols function under a wide range of workloads. Mechanisms for the Internet must be simple, if they are parameterized by more than a few dimensions, they are too difficult to optimize. Note in contrast that the classical economic theory gives complicated mechanisms that are inextricably dependent on the the setting. Finally, mechanisms for the Internet must be practical; this project addresses the disconnect between theory and practice in the computer science literature on mechanism design.

由于自私的用户行为，互联网系统的性能次优;例如垃圾邮件，免费加载，链接垃圾邮件和数据包泛滥。应该如何设计一个多用户系统（如计算机网络），使其在存在自私用户行为的情况下运行良好？ 机制设计领域为计算机网络中的协议、服务和应用程序的设计和分析奠定了经济基础，在这些网络中，用户可能会为了自己的最佳利益而自私地行事。 在不同程度的清晰度，经典的机制设计文献给出了严格的数学工具，从最佳机制可以得出。 不幸的是，除了少数情况下，最佳机制是复杂的，高度依赖于设置的细节，和不切实际的。 Hartline博士详细阐述了这些批评，他的项目包括一个良好的连接研究议程，用于开发与计算机系统相关的机制设计理论。该项目将开发一个通用，简单和实用的机制设计理论。 计算机系统的机制必须是通用的-事实上，互联网的成功部分归功于大多数互联网协议在广泛的工作负荷下运行。 互联网的机制必须是简单的，如果它们被多个维度参数化，它们就太难优化了。 与此相反，古典经济学理论给出了复杂的机制，这些机制不可避免地依赖于环境。 最后，互联网的机制必须是实用的;这个项目解决了在计算机科学文献中关于机制设计的理论与实践之间的脱节。