Collaborative Research: Formal Privacy

在互联网上收集信息的压力越来越大，这就需要更复杂的方法来描述隐私权的特征，并平衡它们与合法的商业和执法目标之间的关系。现在，许多企业都依赖于他们收集在线客户信息的能力，以此作为他们在市场上增加价值的基础。使用或潜在使用互联网的目的，如儿童色情和仇恨犯罪和恐怖主义的计划，提高了人们对网络监控的兴趣（并放宽了监管）。知识产权的盗窃导致了许多保护机制的发展；这通常涉及各种登记和非自愿的监控。为了使安全更容易（并探索有利可图的商业模式），许多公司寻求充当私人信息（如密钥、身份验证秘密和信用卡号码）的第三方看护人。与这些趋势相反的是，许多公民对从他们身上收集信息的激进手段感到愤怒，以及各种捍卫隐私权的团体。在帮助信息收集和限制信息收集的技术方面已经取得了许多进步。一个重要的趋势是采用更先进的系统来创建和管理数字凭证和授权数据库。在目前的实践中，证书有时是“推”的（比如出示电影票进入电影院），有时是“拉”的（比如用“无纸化”机票进入飞机座位），有时两者都是（比如用在线确认有效性的信用卡在商店购物）。这些方法有基于互联网的类似物，近年来技术的进步大大增加了选择的范围。例如，公钥系统的工作具有基于“推送”凭证链的高级委托技术，并提高了凭证收集的自动化程度。另一个重要的趋势是使用匿名技术保护隐私的更先进的系统。洋葱路由器和匿名web发布服务器等工具提供了一些支持，但其他技术直接帮助细粒度机制获得特权，而不会不必要地暴露信息。这项工作旨在为这些进步背景下的隐私特征提供正式支持。到目前为止，改进访问控制系统和凭据分发的努力很少关注隐私机制，导致系统能够可靠地传播凭据，但不能在很好理解的隐私约束下这样做。这项合作将建立在我们在凭证分发和匿名方面的工作基础上，以创建一个集成的架构和协议，在隐私约束的限制下提供高级访问控制。

Growing pressure to collect information on the Internet has created a need formore sophisticated ways to characterize privacy rights and balance them againstlegitimate commercial and law enforcement objectives. A wide range of businessesnow rely on their ability to collect information about online customers as afoundation of their added value in the market place. The use or potential use ofthe Internet for purposes such as child pornography and planning of hate crimesand terrorism have heighted interest in (and loosened regulations on) networkmonitoring. Theft of intellectual property has led to the development ofnumerous protection mechanisms; these often involve registrations and involuntarymonitoring of various kinds. In order to make security easier (and explore alucrative business model), a number of companies seek to act as third-partycaretakers of private information such as keys, authentication secrets, andcredit card numbers. Arrayed against these trends are many citizens incensed byaggressive means used to collect information from them and a variety of groupsthat champion privacy rights.There have been many advances in technologies both to aid information gatheringand limit it. One important trend is toward more advanced systems for creatingand managing digital credentials and authorization databases. In currentpractice credentials are sometimes `pushed' (like presenting a ticket to get intoa movie theater) sometimes `pulled' (like getting access to an airplane seat witha `paperless' ticket) and sometimes both (like making a purchase at a store witha credit card whose validity is confirmed online). These approaches haveInternet-based analogs, and technical advances have increased the range ofoptions considerably in recent years. For example, work on public key systemshas advanced techniques for delegation based on chains of `pushed' credentialsand increased the automation of credential collection. Another important trendis toward more advanced systems for protecting privacy using anonymizingtechniques. Tools such as onion routers and anonymous web publication serversprovide some support but other techniques directly aid fine-grained mechanismsfor obtaining privileges without exposing information unnecessarily. This work aims to develop formal support for characterizing privacy in thecontext of these advances. Efforts to improve access control systems andcredential distribution have paid little attention to privacy mechanisms so far,resulting in systems that are good at propagating credentials reliably, but nottuned to do so within well-understood privacy constraints. This collaborationwill build on our work in credential distribution and anonymity to create anintegrated architecture and protocols to provide advanced access control withinthe limitations of privacy constraints.