State Legislative Reforms to the Selection, Retention and Tenure of State High Court Judges: The Role of Larger Reform Efforts and Political Uncertainty, 1850-2000

题目：国家立法改革的选择，保留和任期的国家高等法院法官：更大的改革努力和政治不确定性的作用，1850-2000 （SES0550434）摘要：在这个项目中，我将分析国家立法决定改变的选择，保留和任期的国家高等法院法官从1850年到2000年。法官的独立性和问责制之间的适当平衡是法律和法院学者长期感兴趣的话题。虽然有大量的历史记载和规范性论点，但很少有系统的、理论上有动机的研究来推动这些改革。有大量的研究清楚地记录了选择、保留和任期的方法和时间如何影响法官做出的各种决定。对特定机构（或群体）更负责的法官更有可能做出支持该机构目标的决定。由于这一选择对法院所制定的政策具有如此重要的影响，因此显然有必要更好地了解围绕这些改革的政治环境。这一点尤其正确，因为各州的改革历史揭示了一个重要的问题：为什么立法者如此频繁地愿意创建一个他们无法控制的司法机构？该项目主要关注对这些变化的两个解释：更大的历史改革和政治不确定性。大多数法官的选拔和保留改革通常被归因于更大的历史改革。然而，这些研究大多是道听途说或依赖于单一国家的研究。该项目的一个目标是系统地测试这些大规模改革运动的效果。更重要的是，本项目还研究了政治不确定性在立法决定中所起的作用，以改变管理司法选择、保留和任期的规则。一个新兴的研究团体认为，现任议员将设立更多独立的法官，以使未来的议员改变目前制定的政策的成本更高。当当前政权未来的选举机会存在不确定性时，他们应该最愿意这样做。研究设计采用汇集的横截面时间序列和事件历史模型，研究了1850年至2000年期间司法选拔、保留和任期的改革。本文还对1900年至1940年间各州从党派选举到无党派选举的转变进行了初步分析。此外，研究设计还纳入了历史媒体报道和立法史，提供了丰富的细节，并对统计分析进行了补充和补充。这个项目的成果将在许多方面产生更广泛的影响。该项目将吸引研究生和本科生参与研究过程。具体来说，该项目将支持一名研究生一年，并将为有前途的本科生提供接触学术研究的机会。我还打算将从这个项目中获得的数据纳入我的本科和研究生的司法课程。这项研究将在全国会议上发表，并将作为期刊出版物和书籍手稿的基础。在更广泛的范围内，该项目产生的数据、代码本和出版物将在我位于亚利桑那州立大学的网站上公开提供给学术界、政策制定者和政策改革者。对法律和法院感兴趣的学者，以及对美国政治、州政治和美国政治发展感兴趣的学者应该对这些数据感兴趣。这将是第一个将选择、保留和任期数据与其他各种州政治和历史背景数据结合在一起的数据集。那些从规范或政策制定的角度对司法独立和问责制感兴趣的人将有一个更完整的基础，了解这些改革最有可能发生的地方，以及改革努力产生变化的效力。

Title: State Legislative Reforms to the Selection, Retention and Tenure of State High Court Judges: The Role of Larger Reform Efforts and Political Uncertainty, 1850-2000 (SES0550434) Abstract In this project, I will analyze state legislative decisions to alter the selection, retention and tenure of state high court judges from 1850 to 2000. The proper balance between independence and accountability of judges is an enduring topic of interest among scholars of law and courts. While there are numerous historical accounts and normative arguments there are few systematic, theoretically motivated studies of the impetus for these reforms. There is a substantial body of research clearly documenting how the method and timing of selection, retention and tenure affects the kinds of decisions judges render. Judges who are more accountable to a particular institution (or group) are significantly more likely to make decisions that support that institutions goals. Since this choice has such important consequences for the policies that courts render, a better understanding of the political circumstances surrounding these reforms is clearly warranted. This is particularly true since the history of reforms in the states reveals an important question: Why have legislators been so frequently willing to create a judiciary over which they will have less control? The project focuses largely on two explanations for these changes: larger historical reforms and political uncertainty. Most judicial selection and retention reforms are often attributed to larger historical reforms. However, that research is largely anecdotal or relies on single state studies. One goal of this project is to test systematically the effect of these larger reform movements. More importantly, this project also examines the role of political uncertainty on legislative decisions to alter the rules that govern judicial selection, retention, and tenure. An emerging body of research argues that incumbent lawmakers will create more independent judges in order to make it more costly for future lawmakers to change the policies currently enacted. They should be most willing to do this when there is uncertainty about the current regimes future electoral chances. The research design employs pooled cross-sectional time series and event history models of reforms to judicial selection, retention and tenure from 1850 to 2000. Preliminary analysis of state-level switches from partisan to nonpartisan elections (1900 to 1940) is included. In addition, the research design also incorporates historical media accounts and legislative histories to provide rich detail and complement and supplement the statistical analyses. The results from this project will have a broader impact in numerous ways. The project will engage students, both graduate and undergraduate, in the research process. Specifically, the project will support a graduate student for one year, and will provide an opportunity for promising undergraduates to be exposed to academic research. I also intend to incorporate the data obtained from this project in my undergraduate and graduate classes on the judiciary. The research will be presented at national conferences and will serve as the basis for journal publications and a book manuscript. On a wider scale, the data, codebooks and publications that result from the project will be made publicly available to the academic community, policy makers, and policy reformers on my website at Arizona State University. Academics interested in law and courts, as well as those interested in American politics, state politics, and American political development should be interested in the data. It will be the first dataset that couples data on selection, retention and tenure with a wide variety of other state political and historical contextual data. Those who are interested in judicial independence and accountability from a normative or policy making perspective will have a more complete foundation of where these reforms are most likely to occur as well as the efficacy of reform efforts to produce change.