Doctoral Dissertation Research: Structural Independence of Administrative Adjudicators and Justice System Stakeholders' Views of Procedural Justice

摘要SES-0550758：“行政裁决者的结构独立性和司法系统利益相关者对程序正义的看法“摘要：社会科学已经认识到程序正义的重要性有一段时间了，司法程序的公正性，预测参与者对司法系统的信任和信心。林德泰勒在20世纪80年代的研究确定了程序正义的核心组成部分，这一理论本身已经在司法和商业组织环境中得到了实证检验。然而，当裁决者不是独立的，即，当负责调查事实和适用法律的人不是中立方，而是受雇于机关，因而与这种争端的一方有密切联系时？本研究将探讨政府机构审裁官的独立性是否对参与者对行政听证公平性的看法有可衡量和可预测的影响。研究的重要性每天，在全国各地，成千上万的公民将被要求出现在某种法官面前。我们最熟悉的是司法分支的法官，他们的职位在结构上与政府的行政和立法部门分开。我们期望这些法官公正，并假定他们是独立的。然而，就数量而言，更多的诉讼当事人出现在不属于司法分支的裁决者面前：他们是行政法法官、听证审查员或任何其他指定的事实调查员，他们为国家行政机构服务，如机动车辆管理局和工人赔偿局。在大约一半的州，这些裁决者由他们审理案件的机构雇用、监督，也可以被解雇。这项研究提出的问题是：这对参与者的公平感有影响吗？我们能否运用林德泰勒范式来检验程序正义，以帮助预测机关裁决者是否会被认为是公正的，即使他们是机关的一部分？是否有一些结构能更好地促进参与者对听证会公平性的看法？本研究将探讨两种行政裁决结构：一种是传统的制度模式，使用的裁决者是行政机关的雇员;另一种代表着一种日益增长的趋势，使用的裁决者是行政分支的一部分，但不受行政机关雇用或控制：他们在一个由全职雇员组成的集中小组中工作，为任何数量的不同机构审理案件。所要解决的问题是：审裁员是否在结构上与行政机关联系在一起，因而不是一个独立的审裁员，对参与者（包括公民、行政机关、审裁员和律师）是否重要？在独立的司法部门裁决的背景下已经得到彻底检验的程序正义理论，是否也适用于裁决者不独立的情况？是否有结构变量可以预测参与者对公平的看法？研究将如何解决这些问题41个州目前允许司机挑战行政许可暂停与驾驶，而在酒精的影响。这些州中约有一半使用由机动车辆部雇用的裁决者;其余的使用中央小组的裁决者，而不是直接与DMV联系在一起。通过文献审查，将确定核心公平指标，并将创建研究工具，以收集参与者对这些停职听证会的公平性的看法。使用这些工具并应用适当的统计工具，研究人员将收集和分析来自中央小组国家和非中央小组国家的数据，以了解参与者是否认为这一过程是公平的（正如林德泰勒和继任分析师所定义的公平）。政府的司法分支在很大程度上依赖于将事实调查委托给行政机构，这在一定程度上解释了为什么如此多的案件由行政机构而不是法院审理。然而，要使这种授权有效，所有利益攸关方至少需要对系统的公平性有最低限度的信任和信心。如果中央小组裁决者能更好地满足这一需求，那么各级政府的执行官员将从了解这一点中受益，特别是考虑到与机构裁决者合并有关的大量成本节省。另一方面，如果公众在很大程度上不受行政机关裁决者结构的影响，那么在那些依赖内部裁决者的州，改变现状可能是不必要的。然而，更广泛的价值在于探讨程序正义的概念是否适用于机关的裁决。我们越了解结构如何影响利益相关者对公平性的看法，我们就越有能力开发出能够赢得所有参与者信任和信心的系统。

Abstract of SES-0550758: "Structural Independence of Administrative Adjudicators and Justice System Stakeholders' View of Procedural Justice"Summary: Social science has for some time now recognized the importance of procedural justice i.e., the fairness of the judicial process in predicting participant trust and confidence in judicial systems. Research by Lind & Tyler in the 1980s identified core components of procedural justice, and the doctrine itself has been empirically tested in judicial and business organizational settings. What happens, however, when the adjudicator is not independent i.e., when the person in charge of fact-finding and applying the law is not a neutral party, but instead is employed by the agency and is thus intimately connected to one side of such a dispute? This research will explore whether the independence of a governmental agency adjudicator has a measurable and predictable impact on participant perceptions of fairness in administrative hearings. Importance of the Research Every day and throughout the nation, thousands of citizens will be required to appear in front of some kind of judge. We are most familiar with judges of the judicial branch those whose positions are structurally separated from the executive and legislative branches of government. We expect fairness from these judges and presume their independence. In terms of sheer numbers, however, far more litigants appear before adjudicators who are not part of the judicial branch: they are administrative law judges, hearing examiners, or any number of other designated fact-finders who serve state administrative agencies, like the Department of Motor Vehicles and the Bureau of Workers Compensation. And in about half of the states, these adjudicators are hired by, supervised by, and can be fired by, the agencies for whom they hear cases. The question posed by this research is: does this make a difference to participant perception of fairness? Can we apply the Lind & Tyler paradigm for testing procedural justice to help predict whether agency adjudicators will be perceived as being fair, even though they are part of the agency? Do some structures better facilitate participant perception that the hearing was fair?Questions the Research Will Address This research will look at two kinds of administrative adjudication structures: one, the traditional institutional model, uses adjudicators who are employees of the agency; the other, representing a growing trend, uses adjudicators who are part of the executive branch but are not hired by nor controlled by the agency: they work in a centralized panel of full-time employees who hear cases for any number of different agencies. The questions addressed will be: does it matter to participants (including the citizens, the agencies, the adjudicators, and the lawyers) whether the adjudicator is structurally tied to the agency and is thus not an independent adjudicator? Do the theories of procedural justice, which have been thoroughly tested in the context of independent judicial-branch adjudications, apply as well in the case where the adjudicator is not independent? Are there structural variables that allow predictions about participant perceptions of fairness? How the Research Will Address these Questions Forty-one states currently permit drivers to challenge administrative license suspensions associated with driving while under the influence of alcohol. About half of these states use adjudicators who are employed by the Department of Motor Vehicles; the rest use adjudicators who are part of central panels, not directly tied to the DMV. Through literature review, core fairness indicators will be identified, and research instruments will be created to gather participant perceptions of fairness in these suspension hearings. Using these instruments and applying appropriate statistical tools, the researchers will gather and analyze data from central panel states and non-central panel states to see whether the participants believe the process was fair (as Lind & Tyler and successor analysts have defined fairness). Broader Social Value of the Research The judicial branch of government depends heavily on the delegation of fact-finding to administrative agencies, which explains in part why so many cases are heard by agencies and not by courts. For this delegation to be effective, however, all stakeholders need to have at least a minimum amount of trust and confidence in the fairness of the system. If the central panel adjudicator better serves this need, then executive officers at all levels of government would benefit from knowing this, particularly given the substantial cost savings thats associated with the consolidation of agency adjudicators. If, on the other hand, the public is largely unaffected by the structure of agency adjudicators, then change from the status quo may be unwarranted, in those states that rely on in-house adjudicators. Broader still, however, is the value in exploring whether notions of procedural justice apply in agency adjudications. The more we know how structure affects stakeholder perceptions of fairness, the better equipped we are to develop systems that enjoy the trust and confidence of all participants.