Doctoral Dissertation Research in DRMS: Framing, Affect, and Decision-Making in Social Dilemmas

在我们的日常生活中，个人利益与集体利益相互依存(或部分冲突)的情况比比皆是。我们在家庭、工作和社交环境中遇到社会困境，比如我们何时必须决定为团队项目贡献多少时间和精力，或者是开车还是乘坐公共交通去上班。这项拟议的研究考察了信息或情景表达方式的细微变化如何对人们思考和回应该事件的方式产生重要影响。初步研究表明，强调不合作的负面集体结果可能会削弱两难境地中的亲社会行为，在这种困境中，合作涉及个人克制，不能获得直接利益，但当合作涉及给予群体时，可能会促进无私行为。目前的工作探索了这一过程的情感调停者。在这项拟议的研究中，三人小组中的个人必须决定如何在个人基金(仅属于个人的财产)和团体基金(由小组中的每个人分享)之间分配一组20美分的硬币。我们将衡量三种不同的框架操作(决策框架、结果框架和回报结构)对个体情绪的影响，以及他们为他们的团队(合作)分配宿舍的意愿。对于决策框架式操纵，季度将从集团基金开始，参与者将有机会自己承担，或者季度将从个人基金开始，参与者将有机会向集团捐赠。集团基金中的季度将面临奖金或罚款(结果框架)，结果将一次分配少量(连续支付)或一次性分配，这取决于是否将指定数量的季度分配给集团(阶梯级支付)。我们预测，惩罚结果框架将导致负面情绪，当决定涉及给予(合作)时，将促使高水平的给予，当决定涉及采取(不合作)时，将促使接受。当结果涉及奖金时，反应模式将是相反的(分别是低水平的给予和接受)，这预计会增加积极的情绪。由于阶梯级回报为人们提供了协调其行为的特定目标，合作在阶段性水平上受情绪的影响应该比在连续条件下要小。

Situations in which individual interests are interdependent with (and partially in conflict with) collective interests are abundant in our daily lives. We encounter social dilemmas in family, work, and social settings, such as when we must decide how much time and effort to contribute to a team project or whether to drive or take public transportation to work. The proposed research examines how subtle variations in the way a message or situation is framed can have important implications for the way people think about and respond to that event. Preliminary research has shown that highlighting the negative collective outcome of non-cooperation can undermine pro-social behavior in dilemmas in which cooperation involves personal restraint from obtaining an immediate benefit, but can promote selfless behavior when cooperation involves giving to the group. The current work explores the affective mediators of this process. In the proposed study, individuals in three-person groups must decide how to distribute a set of 20 quarters between a personal fund (property of the individual only) and a group fund (shared by everyone in the group). We will measure the impact of three different framing manipulations (decision framing, outcome framing, and payoff structure) on individuals' mood and on their willingness to allocate quarters to their group (cooperation). For the decision framing manipulation, the quarters will either start in the group fund and participants will have the opportunity to take for themselves, or the quarters will start in the personal fund and participants will have the opportunity to give to the group. The quarters in the group fund will face either a bonus or a penalty (outcome frame), and that outcome will be distributed either a little at a time (continuous payoff) or in a lump sum depending on whether or not a specified number of quarters are allocated to the group (step-level payoff). We predict that the penalty outcome frame will result in a negative mood, which will prompt high levels of giving when the decision involves giving (cooperation) and taking when the decision involves taking (non-cooperation). The pattern of responses will be opposite (low levels of giving and taking, respectively) when the outcome involves a bonus, which is predicted to increase positive mood. Because the step-level payoff provides people with a specific goal upon which to coordinate their behavior, cooperation should be less influenced by mood in the step-level than in the continuous conditions.