Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: An Experimental Study on Forward Induction: Incorporating Some New Thoughts

这项研究评估了一个博弈论概念，称为向前归纳，在实验室实验中解决非常简单的两人情况下的协调失败的适用性。如果玩家认为他们的对手是理性的，对手在游戏的早期阶段采取的行动可能会传达出他们在游戏后期的预期行动的信息。那么，对于参与者来说，可能更容易协调以获得互利的结果。在具有多个均衡的情况下的选择问题一直是博弈论者面临的挑战。在缺乏协调的情况下，这一问题往往导致有关各方收益方面效率低下的结果。多年来，我们看到了改进均衡概念的不同方法的发展，但几乎没有一种方法似乎是令人满意的，特别是从实践的角度来看。在这种背景下，前向归纳的概念有可能成为协调问题的实际解决方案。广泛影响：在任何学科中，协调失败都是一个令人担忧的问题，例如管理学、营销学、信息技术和经济学，在这些学科中，我们分析了战略互动和稳定性属性。前向归纳的概念似乎是解决这个问题的一种相当简单和直观的解决方案，它的使用可以避免在许多现实生活中的协调失败和效率损失。此外，前向归纳的概念是基于对竞争对手理性的信念。如果玩家真的是理性的，那么向前诱导应该是解决协调失败的有效方法。因此，这项研究的结果也将间接考验球员的理性以及他们对对手理性的信念。以往关于向前诱导的实验研究没有找到太多支持向前诱导的证据，结果也不是很确定。这种不确定可能源于这些早期研究设计中的一些缺陷。通过改进的实验设计，可以避免这一问题，同时可以得出关于正向诱导的有效性和适用性的有效结论。此外，以前的研究中使用的游戏是公平游戏。本研究对他人关注的影响进行了控制，避免了与前向诱导效应的混淆。这是通过特殊的治疗实现的。总而言之，在这一领域有很多需要探索的地方，这将丰富我们的知识。

This study assesses the applicability of a game theoretic concept, known as the forward induction, in resolving coordination failures in a very simple two-player situation in lab experiments. If players believe their opponents to be rational, actions taken by the opponents in the earlier stages of the game might convey information about their intended actions in the later stages of the game. Then it might be easier for the players to coordinate towards a mutually beneficial outcome.The problem of selection in a situation with multiple equilibria has always posed a challenge to game theorists. In the absence of coordination this problem often leads to outcomes that are inefficient in terms of the payoffs of the parties involved. Over the years we have seen the development of different approaches towards the refinement of equilibrium concepts but hardly any of them seems to be satisfactory especially from the practical viewpoint. In this context, the concept of forward induction has the potentiality to be a practical solution for the coordination problem.Broader Impact: Coordination failure is a source of concern in any discipline, such as management, marketing, information technology and economics, where we analyze strategic interaction and the stability properties. The concept of forward induction seems to be a fairly simple and intuitive solution to this problem, and its use could avoid coordination failures and the loss of efficiency in many real life situations. Also, the concept of forward induction is based on the belief about rivals' rationality. If players are truly rational, then forward induction should be an effective solution to coordination failures. Therefore, the results of this study will also be an indirect test of players' rationality and their belief about opponents' rationality.Previous experimental studies on forward induction did not find much support for forward induction and suffered from inconclusive results. This inconclusiveness might arise from some flaws in the design of these earlier studies. With improved experimental design, this problem can be avoided and at the same time valid conclusions on the effectiveness and applicability of forward induction can be drawn. Also, the games used in the previous studies are fairness games. The current study controls for the effects of other-regarding from being confounded with the forward induction effects. This is achieved with particular treatments. In sum, there is much to be explored in this area that will enrich our knowledge.