Dissertation Research: Bidding Behavior in Internet Auction Markets

论文研究：互联网拍卖市场的竞价行为

• 批准号: 0519342
• 负责人: John Wooders
• 金额: $ 0.81万
• 依托单位: University of Arizona
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2005
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2005-08-15 至 2006-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0519342&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Dissertation; Research; Bidding; Behavior; Internet

Internet auction markets are one of the most vibrant and exciting trading institutions of today. A typical online auction is a complicated mechanism offering many design options for the seller to choose from. Furthermore, auctions rarely stand alone. For example, on eBay, the largest marketplace on the Internet, hundreds of auctions for the same or related object close each day. Thus, the buyer is confronted with multitude of options and her decision on how to bid is far from being simple. This doctoral dissertation improvement award will fund an examination of two theories about how market forces influence bidding incentives in the kind of auctions one might find online. The theories will be tested using lab experiments. The data collected from eBay and other auction houses establish two strong empiricalregularities. For example, one group of bidders tends to bid late in the auction while other group likes to progressively revise their bids. We argue that these bidding patterns could be a product of rational response of buyers to the incentives that auction markets generate. Although our theories are largely consistent with the empirical evidence, the main goal of this project is to use experimental methods to further test their robustness. Our experiments will bring new insights into how bidders respond to complicated auctionmechanisms that are commonly implemented on the Internet. They will contribute to the ongoing debate about the interpretation of observed bidding patterns and their overall impact on the performance of auction markets. Findings from this research will allow us to select between numerous explanations that have been proposed about bidding behavior in Internet-type auctions. Based on our results we will be able to evaluate the empirical validity of alternative models and provide implications for designing better and more efficient auction markets.

互联网拍卖市场是当今最具活力和令人兴奋的交易机构之一。一个典型的在线拍卖是一个复杂的机制，提供了许多设计选项供卖家选择。此外，拍卖很少是独立的。例如，在互联网上最大的市场eBay上，每天都会有数百场相同或相关物品的拍卖结束。因此，买方面临着众多的选择，她如何投标的决定远非简单。这个博士论文改进奖将资助两个关于市场力量如何影响在线拍卖中的投标激励的理论的研究。 这些理论将通过实验室实验进行验证。 从eBay和其他拍卖行收集的数据建立了两个强有力的证据。例如，一组出价人倾向于在拍卖后期出价，而另一组喜欢逐步修改他们的出价。我们认为，这些出价模式可能是一个产品的理性反应的买家的激励拍卖市场产生。虽然我们的理论在很大程度上与经验证据相一致，但本项目的主要目标是使用实验方法进一步测试其鲁棒性。我们的实验将带来新的见解，投标人如何应对复杂的拍卖机制，通常在互联网上实现。它们将有助于目前就如何解释观察到的出价模式及其对拍卖市场表现的总体影响进行的辩论。这项研究的结果将使我们能够选择之间的许多解释，已提出了关于投标行为在互联网型拍卖。基于我们的研究结果，我们将能够评估替代模型的实证有效性，并提供设计更好，更有效的拍卖市场的影响。