Dissertation Research in Political Science: Political Parties, Economic Policy, and Democratic Consolidation

政治学论文研究：政党，经济政策和民主巩固首席研究员：赫伯特基切尔特，杜克大学合作研究员：丹尼尔Kselman，杜克大学在过去的15年里，见证了对正式民主制度的政治和经济后果的研究洪水。在这个广泛的领域中最突出的研究项目之一是研究选举机构对各种经济政策和结果的影响。尽管这是一个庞大而多样的工作机构，但几乎一致援引了以下逻辑：选举机构构建了对立政党之间的竞争领域，根据一个国家的特定体制结构，为现任立法者和选举候选人提供了不同的政策激励。尽管这一研究具有重要意义，但其理论和实证研究结果一直受到一系列内在矛盾的困扰。拟议的论文认为，这种矛盾产生于一个狭隘的政党之间的竞争（党际）的重点，在政党内的竞争（党内）的制度分析的代价。在这方面的初步调查（Kselman 2005，2006）表明，一个政党内部和内部竞争的同时分析允许一个更普遍的理解选举制度的后果，政治腐败，经济再分配，和公共预算的规模。此外，将党内竞争纳入正式和经验模型，暴露了选举制度可能对民主巩固的影响。再次，初步的理论研究具体说明了特定的制度组合，这可能是有害的民主stability.The拟议的研究开发了一个博弈论模型，该模型产生的假设有关的经济政策和民主stability. The选举制度的相互和互动的影响。为了尽可能广泛地评估该理论的普遍适用性，这些假设进行了测试与跨国数据，涵盖70-80个民主国家;与汇集的时间序列数据，从18个先进的工业民主国家之间的1960年和2000年;并与定性的案例研究，辅以6个月的密集实地考察在土耳其。我在土耳其的时间将用于收集当地可用的数据，这些数据涉及1950年至今的政党内部组织和经济政策的性质。此外，我还将确保与目前执政的正义与发展党的领导人进行深入访谈。正义与发展党是一个伊斯兰传统政党，最近开始集中其内部权力结构。理论和经验的结果有助于阐明经济繁荣和民主稳定的制度基础。此外，在土耳其的实地考察将提供有关世界上少数成功之一的可持续性的实际信息，将政治伊斯兰和民主竞争结合起来。因此，拟议的研究旨在产生既科学严谨又与促进个人和社会福祉相关的结果。

Dissertation Research in Political Science: Political Parties, Economic Policy, and Democratic ConsolidationPrincipal Investigator: Herbert Kitschelt, Duke UniversityCo-Investigator: Daniel Kselman, Duke University The last 15 years have witnessed a flood of research on the political and economic consequences of formal democratic institutions. One of the most prominent research programs within this broad field examines the effect of electoral institutions on a variety of economic policies and outcomes. Though a large and heterogeneous body of work, it has nearly unanimously invoked the following logic: electoral institutions structure the domain of competition between opposing political parties, providing incumbent legislators and electoral candidates varying policy incentives depending on a countrys particular institutional configuration. Despite the importance of this research, its theoretical and empirical findings have been plagued by a series of internal contradictions. The proposed dissertation argues that such contradictions arise from a narrow focus on competition between political parties (inter-party), at the expense of an institutional analysis of competition within political parties (intra-party). Preliminary investigation in this vein (Kselman 2005, 2006) suggests that a simultaneous analysis of inter and intra-party competition permits a more general understanding of electoral institutions consequences for political corruption, economic redistribution, and the size of the public budget. Furthermore, the incorporation of intra-party competition into both formal and empirical models exposes the affect electoral institutions may have on democratic consolidation. Again, preliminary theoretical investigation specifies particular institutional combinations which may be detrimental to democratic stability.The proposed research develops a game theoretic model which generates hypotheses concerning the mutual and interactive affect of electoral institutions on economic policy and democratic stability. To assess the general applicability of the theory in as broad a manner as possible, these hypotheses are tested with cross-national data covering 70-80 democratic countries; with pooled time series data from 18 advanced industrial democracies between 1960 and 2000; and with qualitative case research complemented by 6 months of intensive fieldwork in Turkey. My time in Turkey will be spent gathering locally available data on the internal organization of political parties and the nature of economic policy from 1950 to the present. As well, I will secure and conduct in depth interviews with leaders of the presently ruling Justice and Development Party, a party of Islamic heritage which has recently moved to centralize its internal power structures. Together the theoretical and empirical results help shed light on the institutional foundations of economic prosperity and democratic stability. Furthermore, the fieldwork in Turkey will provide hands on information regarding the sustainability of one of the few successes in the world in integrating political Islam and democratic competition. As such, the proposed research aims to produce results which are both scientifically rigorous and relevant in the promotion of individual and social well-being.