Supply Risk Management and Asymmetric Information

AbstractThe赠款提供资金的发展和分析的博弈论模型，将明确功能的信息不对称的供应风险。 这些模型将用于研究传统的风险管理政策和信息获取合同如何相互作用。 将纳入模型的传统风险管理工具有：制造商发展内部生产能力;供应商投资于后备生产能力;制造商采用多来源和健全的网络设计;对不交货的处罚;供应商筛选;采购授权。 PI将调用的概念，从合同和激励理论，如贝叶斯均衡，启示原则，共谋，和决策委托，以获得制造商的最佳信息获取合同。 为了确定信息不对称对风险管理的影响，PI将通过分析和数值方法比较不对称和对称信息下的均衡结果。 研究成果将被纳入密歇根大学的研究生和本科生课程中。这一跨学科研究位于运营、风险管理和信息经济学的界面上，将及时解决有关弹性供应链设计和管理的重要问题。这项研究将有助于业务文献的框架捕捉信息不对称的供应风险和采购服务提供商的风险缓解作用的见解。这项研究将扩大企业风险管理文献的边界，考虑分散的决策系统中存在的信息不对称。 这项研究将丰富经济学文献，包括供应中断的可能性。 这项研究的结果将有助于决策者更好地利用运营和风险管理工具来应对供应中断。 该研究项目将促进行业研究人员，工程和商业教师之间的持续互动和合作，并将为未来的联合项目永久化基础设施。

AbstractThe grant provides funding for the development and analysis of game-theoretic models that will explicitly feature information asymmetry about supply risk. These models will be used to study how traditional risk-management policies and information-eliciting contracts interact. The traditional risk management tools that will be included in the models are: development of internal production capabilities by the manufacturer; investment in backup production capacity by suppliers; adoption of multisourcing and robust network design by the manufacturer; penalties for non-delivery; supplier screening; and procurement delegation. The PIs will invoke concepts from contracts and incentives theory, such as Bayesian equilibria, the revelation principle, collusion, and decision-delegation, to derive the manufacturer's optimal information-eliciting contracts. In order to identify the ramifications of information asymmetry on risk management, the PIs will compare equilibrium outcomes under asymmetric and symmetric information through both analytical and numerical means. The results of the research will be incorporated in the curriculum of graduate and undergraduate courses at the University of Michigan.This multi-disciplinary research, which lies at the interface of operations, risk management, and information economics, will address timely and important questions regarding design and management of resilient supply chains. To the operations literature this research will contribute a framework capturing information asymmetry about supply risk and insights on the risk-mitigating role of procurement service providers. This research will expand the boundaries of the enterprise risk management literature by considering decentralized decision systems in the presence of information asymmetry. This research will enrich the economics literature by including the possibility of supply disruptions. The results of this research will help decision makers to make better use of operational and risk-management tools to deal with supply disruptions. This research project will foster continued interactions and collaboration among industry researchers, engineering and business faculty, and will perpetuate infrastructure for future joint projects.