Regulating the Selection of Products under Investment Accounts Pension System: A Study of the Chilean Experience

这项赔偿是根据2009年《美国复苏和再投资法案》(公法111-5)提供资金的。随着每名工人养老金领取人数的增加，美国和欧洲的许多现收现付制社会保障制度面临破产的阻碍。正在考虑的可能改革之一是过渡到资金完全私有化的账户系统。1980年，智利是第一个从现收现付制转变为全额资金私人退休账户制度的国家。智利的养老金制度是许多拉丁美洲国家养老金改革的典范，最近一次是在墨西哥。美国和欧洲的政策制定者也在密切关注智利的经历。本项目研究了在基金业绩受到监管约束的情况下，寡头垄断养老金投资行业的产品选择和后续定价问题。具体地说，我们建立和估计了消费者养老基金选择以及企业产品和定价选择的均衡模型。养老金投资行业将消费者暴露在市场风险之下。政府扮演着最后担保人的角色，对因低收入或不利回报而不足的养老金积累进行补充。因此，高风险的养老金投资可能导致高水平的政府义务。此外，政府担保可能会诱导低收入个人的风险寻求行为，竞争行业可能会通过高风险的投资组合来满足这一需求。因此，公司向市场提供的投资产品的选择是私有化养老金制度总体成功的一个重要因素。智利政府通过对回报进行监管，将风险从消费者转移到基金经理身上，从而解决了这个问题。我们使用我们估计的消费者和养老基金公司决策模型，(I)调查智利现行监管制度在限制系统风险方面的有效性，(Ii)将现行制度与其他监管形式进行比较，(Iii)调查养老金产品的社会最佳选择，以及(Iv)探索竞争对收费结构上提供的投资产品的影响。我们的重点是智利，但这项研究的结果应该引起更广泛的关注。美国和欧洲的养老金改革提案假定，在养老金积累不足的情况下，政府会补充养老金收入。因此，这些国家可能会面临类似的担忧，即通过养老金制度选择可供消费者使用的投资组合。广泛影响：拟议的研究议程将加强对具有差异化产品的市场中产品选择和定价决策的理解。它还将告知其他种类的监管限制对公司决策和消费者福利的影响。例如，旨在限制养老金市场风险的监管实际上可能会产生意想不到的后果，即增加公司的风险承担。所提出的模型框架还可以扩展到研究道德风险对产品选择的影响，以及在没有逆向选择的情况下市场上的非线性定价。这项研究促进了对全额基金养老金制度设计和运营中涉及的复杂问题的理解。它还有助于评估全额供资制度作为现有现收现付制度的可能替代办法的可行性。此外，该项目还对教学和培训产生了更广泛的影响。研究生将参与数据分析。这项研究的结果将通过研讨会、会议和出版物广泛传播，作者希望在他们的本科生和研究生课程材料中包括这项研究的结果。

This award is funded under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-5).Many pay-as-you-go social security systems in the United States and Europe face impeding insolvency as the number of pensioners per worker rises. Among the possible reforms being considered is transiting to fully funded privatized accounts system. Chile was the first country to switch from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully funded private retirement accounts system in 1980. Chile's pension system has served as a prototype for pension reform in many Latin American countries, most recently in Mexico. U.S. and European policy makers are also looking with keen interest at the Chilean experience. This project investigates the choice of product and subsequent pricing in an oligopolistic pension investment industry under regulatory constraints on fund performance. Specifically, we develop and estimate an equilibrium model of consumer pension fund choices and of firm product and pricing choices. The pension investment industry exposes consumers to market risk. The government plays the role of a guarantor of last resort, supplementing pension accumulations that are insufficient either due to low income or unfavorable returns. Risky pension investments can therefore lead to a high level of government obligations. Additionally, the government guarantee may induce risk seeking behavior in low income individuals, and a competitive industry would likely over risky investment portfolios to meet this demand. The selection of investment products that firms offer to the market is therefore an important factor in the overall success of a privatized pension system. The Chilean government addresses this problem by regulating returns in a way that shifts the risk from consumers to money managers. We use our estimated model of decision-making by consumers and by pension fund companies (i) to investigate the effectiveness of the existing Chilean regulation in limiting risk in the system, (ii) to compare the current system to alternative forms of regulation, (iii) to investigate the socially optimal choice of pension products and (iv) to explore the effects of competition on the investment products offered on fee structures. Our focus is on Chile, but the results of this study should be of a more general interest. Pension reform proposals in the US and in Europe assume that the government supplements pension income in the case of insufficient accumulations. Therefore, these countries may face similar concerns about the selection of investment portfolios available to consumers through the pension system.Broader Impacts: The proposed research agenda will enhance the understanding of product choice and pricing decisions in the markets with differentiated products. It will also inform on the effects of alternative kinds of regulatory restrictions on firm decisions and on consumer welfare. For example, regulation that was designed to limit risk in the pension market can actually have the unintended consequences of increasing risk-taking by firms. The modeling framework proposed can also be extended to investigate the impact of the moral hazard on product selection as well as non-linear pricing in the market without adverse selection. This research fosters the understanding of the complex issues involved in design and operation of a fully funded pension system. It also contributes to the assessment of the viability of fully funded systems as a possible alternative to pay-as you go system currently in place. In addition, the project has broader impacts on teaching and training. Graduate students will participate in the data analysis. The results from this research will be widely disseminated through seminars, conferences and publications and the authors expect to include results from this research in their undergraduate and graduate course material.