Temporal Existence and Ontological Indeterminism in Minkowski Spacetime

认为未来是开放的，即不仅在认识论上，而且在本体论上是不确定的，这种观点显然把现在的存在与存在的边缘区分开来。相应地，自著名的普特南/斯坦之争以来，在科学哲学中，相对论与时间和实在的动态观的相容性和与本体论非决定论的相容性这两个问题被认为是紧密相连的。许多作者（如McCall和Belnap）认为，非决定论至少是动态时间观的必要条件，因此，它要么构成一个不断增长的块，要么构成一个存在主义的宇宙。但事实上，这两个概念可能是相互独立的（见艾斯菲尔德）。考虑到非决定论的意义取决于对自然法则的看法，可能有助于澄清它与动态时间观的联系。基于自然法则的还原观（参见刘易斯关于休谟的监督观），非决定论肯定是与永恒论相容的。但更有趣的问题出现了，对自然法则的现实理解（参见芒福德的性情形而上学）是如何与块宇宙观联系起来的。在这种意义上，一个不确定的宇宙会是永恒的吗？或者这样一个宇宙是动态的，即使定律是确定的？

The view that the future is open, i.e., not only epistemically but ontologically indetermined distinguishes, apparently, the present being the edge of being. Correspondingly, since the famous Putnam/Stein-controversy, in philosophy of science the two problems of the compatibility of relativity with dynamic views of time and reality and with ontological indeterminism are considered as being deeply connected. Many authors (like McCall and Belnap) regard indeterminism at least a necessary condition for a dynamic view of time, being thus constitutive either for a growing block or a presentistic universe. But in fact both conceptions might rather be independent (see Esfeld). Taking into account that the meaning of indeterminism depends on the view of natural laws might be helpful in order to clarify its connection to dynamic views of time. Based on the reductive view of natural laws (see Lewis idea of Humean supervenience) indeterminism is surely compatible with eternalism. But the more interesting question arises, how a realistic understanding of natural laws (see Mumfords metaphysics of dispositions) is related to the block universe view. Could an indeterministic universe in that sense be eternal? Or is such a universe dynamical, even if the laws were deterministic?