Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Voter Behavior And Seniority Advantage In Congress

这个项目调查了国会中由于资历优势而产生的选民行为。选民们有可能通过重新选举现任者以保持资历来争夺猪肉桶基金。这导致税收资金从拥有初级议员的地区或州转移到拥有高级议员的地区或州。主要的兴趣在于发现选民是对金钱奖励更有反应，还是对政策代表带来的内心刺激更有反应。任期限制也被认为是一种机制，以减少选举挑战者的成本，以及减少猪肉桶分配的不对称性。在受控实验室实验中，受试者被划分为选区，并扮演立法者和选民的角色。智力优势：以前没有实验研究测试受试者对金钱回报的反应和对内脏刺激的反应，更不用说在投票这样相关的环境中了。许多关于资历优势的现有文献都提出，选民更喜欢金钱利益而不是政策代表，但这是对这种观点的第一次尝试。实验设计的新颖之处在于，它通过政治问题来刺激内脏，并通过向支持特定政治问题的特定方面的基金会捐款来表达政策支持。发现选民在投票决策中对金钱利益的重视程度低于对政策代表的重视，将影响经济学家和政治学家看待投票选择的方式。这样的发现也会自然而然地导致调查投票行为的演变，以及这一结果是对激励的自然反应，还是选民受到当前制度的制约。更广泛的影响：如果发现任期限制在减少税收优惠差距以及减少寻找更好的政策代表的成本方面是有效的，那么应该认真考虑改变国会的内部机构。

This project investigates voter behavior due to seniority advantage in Congress. It is possible that voters compete for pork barrel funds by reelecting incumbents to maintain seniority. This leads to a transfer of tax dollars from districts or states with junior legislators to those with more senior ones. Primary interest lies in discovering whether voters respond more to monetary rewards or visceral stimulation caused by policy representation. Term limits are also considered as a mechanism to reduce the cost of electing a challenger as well as reducing the asymmetry in pork barrel distribution. Controlled laboratory experiments are utilized where subjects are divided into districts and act as legislators and voters. Intellectual Merit: There are no previous experimental studies that test subject reactions to monetary payoffs against reactions to visceral stimulation, let alone in a setting as relevant as voting. Much of the existing literature on seniority advantage proposes that voters prefermonetary benefits to policy representation, but this is the first attempt to test that belief. The experimental design is novel in its use of visceral stimulation via political issues as well as the method by which subjects express policy support through donations to foundations that support particular sides of the featured political issue. Finding that voters weigh monetary benefits less heavily in the voting decision than policy representation will impact the way economists and political scientists view vote choice. Such a finding would also lead naturally to investigating the evolution of voting behavior and whether this result is a natural response to incentives or whether voters have been conditioned by current institutions.Broader Impacts: If term limits are found to be effective at reducing disparity in tax benefits as well reducing the cost of searching for better policy representation, serious consideration should be given to changing the internal institutions of Congress.